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CHANGING THE BATHWATER AND KEEPING THE BABY: 1
EXPLORING NEW WAYS OF EVALUATING INTENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION CASES

BROWNE C. LEWIS*

ABSTRACT
Minorities in the United States live in areas that are heavily polluted. In
addition to dealing vi:ith the pollution generated by their neighborhoods,
minorities often are exposed to environmental hazards that provide services
for the entire community. The problem of the disproportionate placement of
environn1ental haz.ards in minority communities is well documented. A
primary cause of the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards in this
country is environmental discrimination based on class and race.
Persons combating environmental discrimination have attempted to get
relief relying upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unfortunately, plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases have hit a brick
wall-the requirement that they prove the decision to place the environmental
hazard in their neighborhood lo/"as motivated by an intent to discriminate on the
part of the decision-makers. In response, advocates have proposed replacing
intent as the evidentiary requirement in Equal Protection Cases. If properly
applied, the intent requirement is a perfectly viable evidentiary method.
Therefore, I propose keeping the intent requirement and changing the manner
I This title is a twist on the proverb: "Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater." There
is so1ne controversy surrounding the origin of the proverb. The following is one view:
Baths equaled a big tub filled with hot water. The man of the house had the privilege of
the: nice clean water, then all the other sons and men, then the women and finally the
children. Last of all the babies. By then the water was so dirty you could actually lose
someone in it. Hence the saying, ''Don't throw the baby out with the bath water."
More Eccentricities of the English Language,http:/lwww.wordskit.com/language/legend<;/
bathwatcr.shtml (lase visited Feb. 9, 2005).
* Assis1ant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy Schoo! of Law, B.A., Grambling State
University, J.D., University of Minnesota, L.L.M., Energy & Environmental Law, University of
Houston, M.P.A., Hubert H. Humphrey lnstitutc of Public Affairs. I would like to thank the
following persons for their assistance in the preparation of this article: Professor Pamela Wilkins,
Professor Robin Magee, Professor lmani Perry, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Professor
Canulle Nelson, Professor Bernie D. Jones, Dean Mark Gordon, Urooj Usman, and Melodee
Henderson.
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in which the courts determine if the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement.
The courts should presume intent if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that
the decision to place the environmental hazard in their neighborhood was
unreasonable.
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lr\TRODUCTION

Given the United States' legacy of discriminatory activity, in Professor
Robert D. Bullard's2 opinion, it is not surprising that the country's
environmental laws, regulations, and policies have not been consistently
applied across all sectors of the populace. For instance, low-income families
and minorities are forced to tolerate an unequal burden of the country's
"pollution problems." Consequently, persons in those communities are
exposed to the public health threat~ that accompany environmental hazards. 3
Professor Bullard was one of the fir~t per~ons to write about the rampant
environmental discrimination in the United States. According to Professor
Bullard, the current environmental protection regime is designed to provide
greater benefits and protection for white persons living in middle- and upper
income communities while allocating costs to low-income and minority
4
persons. Therefore, Professor Bullard and others advocate reconstructing the
current environmental protection regime to address the issue of environmental
discrimination.·'
For years, governmental decision-makers have contributed to the
disproportionate placeinent of environmental hazards in low-income6 and

2. Hullard is one of the leading e~perts in the field of environn1ental JU>\1ee. He was one of
the planners of the f.irst Nutional People of Color Environn1ental l.caderslnp Sumn1i1.
1. Rohen ])_ Hullard. ln1rodu(:/1un to UNl".QUAL l'ROTECTIOJ\: E'.\VIRUNM~....-TAL 1U5TJCE
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, at xv, vv (Rohert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter LTJ\EQlJAL
PROTECTION].

4. Id. at xv-xvi.
5. Hullard states.
[T]hc dorninant environ•nental protection paradign1 (1) instinnionali7e> unequal
enforcement; (2) trades hurnan health for profit; (3) places the hurden of proof on the
"victim<;." not on the polluting indu<;try: (4) legitimates hurnan exposure to harmful
chemicals, pc-.ticidcs, and hazardous -;uhstances; (5) promotes "nsky" technologies, such
as incinerator-.; (6) exploit-. the imlnerahihty of economically and poht1cally
disenfranchised com1nunilies. (7) >ubs1<l1leS ecological dc<;truction: (8) creates an
industry around risk a1>e;;rnent; (9) delays cleanup actions; and (10) fails to develop
pollution prc;cntion as the overarching and dominant strategy.
Id. at xvi
6. \Vhcn dealing with environmental justice i'>sucs, advocates have identified the low
incorne populauon in an affected area by u;ing the annual statistical poveny thrc<;holds from the
Hureau of the Censu;'; Current Population Reports. Series P-60 on Income and Poverty. See
COUJ\Cll. ON E:-!VT. QUALITY, EXEC. 0!"TICF Of' THE l'RFS!DENT, EJ\V!RONMENTAL JL:STlCE:
Gt}JDANCJ: UND!-'R THE NATIUJ\/\L ENVJRU:-IMENTAI. POLICY ACT 25 (1997). available at
http://www.v..Tt.doc.gov/envju'>ticc/pdf/ justicc.pdf [hercinafier CEQ GUIDllNCFI. However, for
the purpo;e of clanty, I am u<;ing the term a' defined in the housing area A "low-income farnily"
11 a farni!y that has incon1e that doc;, not exceed 80 percent of the median income for the area
v..·h~re the family reside~. 42 L:.s.C. § 1437(b)(2) (2000).
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8
m1nonty communities. Environ111cntal discrin1ination based upon class and
race i~ one possible cause of the unequal distribution of environmental hazards.
The recognition that low-income and minority persons have been unequally
treated in the environmental protection arena led to the development of the
environmental justice movcn1ent. 9 "Environmental justice" is the term used to
refer to the steps that have been taken to remedy environmental
10
discrimination.
Persons discussing the problem of the disproportionate
place1nent of environmental hazard~ in low-income and minority
neighborhoods have also used the terms "environrnental racis1n" 11 and
7. In the environrncnlalju>tice arena, the term "m1nori1{' i-, used to refer to the following
four major racial and ethnic groups. (1) Blacks. (2) American Indian; and Alaska Kative;, (3)
Asian> and Pacific Islanders. and (4) Hispanics. CEQ GUIDAJ\'CE, supra note 6, at 25. In the
context of this Artide. "nllnority populations" broadly refers to all persons except non-Hispanic
See U.S. GEJ\'. ACCOUNTJl>.'G 0FHCF, GAO/RCED-95-84, HA:tARDUU5 A:-!D
whites.
NUNHA:tARDUUS WAS-IE: DEMOGRAPHICS Of PEOPLE LJVl:-!G N!·.AR WASTL FACJLIIII~~ 17 n.2
at
http://www.gao.gov/archi ve/J 995/re95084.pdf [hereinafter
(June
1995). availah/e
(iAOIRCJ---JJ-95-84]_
8. In this Article, I use lhc lenn "cn;ironrnental haLanh'' to refer lo projeds that pollute the
environrncnt and those that ha;e the potential to pollute.
9. The United Slates Env1ronn1ental Protection Agency {EPA) defines cnvironrnental
ju~riee as:
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regard!e;,;, of race, color,
national origin. or income with re;pcct to the development, implernenlation, mid
enforce1nent of environrnenlal laws, regulations, and policies. !'air treattncnt means that
no group of people, indud1ng racial, ethnic, or socioeconotnic group should bear a
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from
indu<;1rial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, lucal,
and rrihal program~ and policic<;_
[NVTL. PROT AG!o:-!CY, Fr:>AL GlJIDAJ\C!: FOR INCORPORATING E"1VIROJ\'MENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS !:-! EPA'S NEPA COMPLIA:-!CE ANALYSES § 1 1.1 (Apr. 1998). availahle al
hllp .//www .epa.gov/comphance/resources/pohc1es/ej/ej_guidancc_ ncpa_ epa0498_ pdf l hcrci naftcr
EPA GUlDAJ\'CE], see also Envtl. Prol. Agency, Evironmcntal Justice, http://www.cpa.gov/
crnnplianccJenvironmental justice (last visited Oct. 6. 2005).
10_ Major Willie A_ Gunn, From thr: f,,,ndflll to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing
lc'mpowerrnent Strategie.1 to Al/evrale t:nwronmental lnju.nice, 2201!101'".U. L. REV 1227, 1235
(1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprin1ed in 42 U.S C_ § 4321
(1994)).

11 The knn "enviruna1ental raci>m'' was invented hy Dr_ Benjamin Chavis, Jr. in 1982. lie
defined the tcrn1 a5:
racial di;crimination in environmental policy[-]mak1ng and the unequal enforcetncnt of
envaonmcntal la\11s and regulations_ It 1~ the deliberate targeting of people of color
con1n1un1t1e~ for luxic wa~te facilities and the official sanctioning of a life threatening
prc5cnce of poisons and pollutants in people of color communitie-.. It is also manifested
in the history of excluding people of color from the leadership of the environnicntal
nio;e1nent.
Robert M. Frye, l~nviro111nental l!ijUStlce: The Failure of AmPncan Civil Rig/us and
Environmental Law to Provide Equal Protection fram Pollut1on, :l DIC:K J_ EJ\YTL.. L. & POL'Y
53, 56 (1993) (quoting Environmental Raci:,·m: Hearings Before the House Subconun. on Civil
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"environmental equity." 12
In this Article, the tenn "environmental
discrimination" is used to refer to the practice of disproportionately locating
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities. The core
premise of this Article focuses on the use of the Equal Protection Clause to
combat environmental discrimination. Thus, I will be dealing exclusively with
the location of environmental hazards in minority communities.
After an environmental hazard has been placed in a minority community,
the residents might not feel the negative impact for several years. Whenever
the members of a community experience adverse consequences because of an
environmental hazard, persons seeking to help them typically have three main
objectives. The first goal is to have the environmental hazard put out of
operation. 13 The second goal is to receive compensation for persons who have
14
been injured by the environmental hazard.
The final goal is to prevent new
environmental hazards from being placed 1n and near the impacted
15
community.
When the persons affected are minorities, one of the primary
tools advocates have attempted to use to achieve their goals is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
A substantial amount of evidence shows that federal, state, and local
governmental decision-makers have permitted a disproportionate number of
environmental hazards, including hazardous waste incinerators and harmful

and Cnn.1titutinnal Rights. 103d Cong., 1st Se~s. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F.
Chavis. Jr.. Executive Director. United Church of Christ Commission for Racial JuSlice); see also
Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed .. 1993) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS].
12. The term "environmental equity" has been used by the EPA to refer to "the distribution
and effects of environmental problem~ and the policies and processes to reduce differences in
who bears environmental risks." ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING
RISK RJR ALL COMMUNITIES 2 (1992), available at http:f/www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publicalions/ej/reducing_risk_com_voll.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY]. According
to its workgroup report. the EPA used the tcnn because "'it most readily lends itself to scientific
risk analysis." Id.
13. See ROBERT 0. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 49 ( l 990) (discussing how members of a predontinantly minority community organized
to have a lead smelter put out of operation).
14. Id. at 44 (discussing how minority residents organized to ha!t the construction of a
landfill in their subdivision).
15. Kathy Seward Northern, Bauery and Beyond: A Tort Ww Response to Environn1ental
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485. 535 (1997); see also Kirsten H. Engel,
Brownfield Initiatives and Environnienta/ Justice: Second-Class Cleanup.> nr Marke1-Ba.1ed
Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 329 (1997-1998) (discussing attempts by
persons combating environmental discnminat1on to get "legislative moratoriums" passed to
prevent the placement of additional environmental hazards in minority cornrnunities that are
already over-saturated with pollution-generating activities).
16. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV,§ 1
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industrial processes, to be placed 1n minority communities. 17 Governmental
authorities also have been remiss in enforcing environmental regulations in
18
those communities.
As a consequence of this apparent unequal treatment
under the law, advocates have attempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to
challenge the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities on
the ground that the government decision-maker was racially discriminatory in
approving the activity. 19
Environmental discrimination cases have been largely unsuccessful
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove discriminatory intent on the part
of the decision-maker. 20 Jn the absence of negligence, persons usually are only
legally accountable for their intentional actions. Hence, discriminatory intent
should not be replaced as the standard of proof in environmental discrimination
cases. Nonetheless, fairness dictates that the manner in which the courts
evaluate whether or not the intent requirement has been met should be
modified. Under the current system, even after proving disparate impact, in
order to satisfy the intent requirement, a plaintiff must prove that the decision
maker's action was motivated by an intent to discriminate. 21 1nstead of
mandatory proof of conscious, purposeful discriminatory intent, the court
should analyze the facts to see if there is a valid reason to presume
discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part one consists of a general
overview of the problem of environmental discrimination. Part two gives a
brief discussion of relevant Equal Protection jurisprudence. The section begins
with a summary of general Equal Protection law. Then, the section analyzes
the primary cases that established the foundation of modem-day Equal
Protection doctrine. Part three examines the current application of the intent
requirement in environmental discrimination cases. To that end, the section
reviews the outcome of three of the early environmental discrimination cases,
and speculates about the components that are necessary to prepare a successful
Equal Protection challenge in the environmental arena. Part four consists of an
extensive analysis of the debate over the validity of the intent requirement.
The section starts by encapsulating a few of the proposed theories put forth to
replace or modify the intent requirement. The section ends with my suggestion
for refining the current application of the intent standard to make the process
fairer to the plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases.
17. Northem,supranotel5,at535.
18. Id.
19. M. Patrice Benford, Note, Life, Liberry & rhe Pursuit of Clean Air: Fighr for
En~·ironmental Equality, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 275 (1995); see also R.1.S.E., Inc. v.
Kay, 768 F. Supp 1144, I 149 (E.D. Va. 1991).
20. See Pan II, infra, for a discussion of the three key environmental discrimination cases
that proves this assertion.
21. R.l.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149.
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I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of environmental discrimination has been documented in
several studies and discussed in numerous books and law review articles.
Therefore, I only will briefly highlight the information contained in those
sources.
After a protest by black residents in Warren County, North Carolina, 22 the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) sponsored a study to
determine the extent of environmental discrimination in America. 23 As a result
of its observations, the GAO concluded that a correlation existed between the
decisions to place hazardous waste landfills in an area and the race and income
24
level of the people living in the area.
Governmental agencies were not the only organizations concerned about
the adverse impact environmental hazards had on low-income and minority
persons. In 1987, the United Church of Christ (UCC) did its own analysis of
25
the problcm. After analyzing all of the data, the UCC determined that race,
not socioeconomic status, accounted for the fact that certain communities in
the United States had more hazardous waste facilities than other
2
communities. ~
22. In 1982, a coalition of c1~11 rights groups protested the place1ncnt or a landfill in a hlack
county See Gunn, supra note 10, at 1228 (citing Marcia Coyle, When Moven1enrs Coalesce,
NAT.I. L J_, Sept. 21, l\192, at SIO.)
23. As a part of the information-gathering proce<;<;, GAO staff n1ct with an official of the
Southern Christian Leallership Conference to d1~cu<;s racial issues ,,urrounlling selection of the
Warren County PCB lanllfill site. GE;.;. ACCOUNTING OFFICI".. GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF
1-IAZARDOUS W>\STI'. l.ANDl'ILLS >\J\!J THE!R CORRELATION WITH RACIAL A:-<D EcO:-!OMIC
STATUS or SllRROlJNDIJ\G CO\l'lltl;:-irrrEs 2 (1983) [hereinafter GAO!RCED-83-168]
The
panicipanL'> in the study examined landfills in the eight st:iles that eornposc EPA's Region IV
(Alabarna, f'lorida, Gcorg1:i, Kentucky, Miss1s~ippi, North Carolina. South Carolina, and
Tennessee). Id.
24 ENVIRO;-.;M!-.1'TAL E(.llJITY, :iupru note 12, ~ 2.2.l (citing GAO!RCED-83-168. _1upra
note 23). The person> conducting the study Lliscovercd that three or the four co1nmercial
hazardous waste facilitie> in the region were in predo1ninatdy African Arnerican comrnun1ties
and lhe fourth was in a low-incon1e com1nuni1y. GAO/RCED-83-168, oupra note 23, at l
furthermore, at least twenty-six percent of the population living in all four communitie> had
incomes helow the poverty level. Id. African Amencans niade up the majority of the persons
living in po>erty. Id.
25. A~ a part of the stully, the UCC examined RCRA corn1nereial ha~.ardous waste facilities
across the country. GAO/RCED-95-84, supra note 7, at 14 (citing CUMM'N 1-'0R RACIAL
1CSTICE, UNITED CHURCH 01-' CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THI". Ui.·1TED STATES: A
NATIONAL REPORT U:-< THI' RACIAL AND SOCIOEC01''0)..flC CHARACT!'.RJSTICS or COMMlJJ\ITIES
\\'ITH HAZARDOUS WA5TI". S!TFS (1987) !hereinafter UCC STCDY]); see a/;o BULLARD, supra
note 13, at 17. The LCC '1udy was more comprehensive than the GAO report because the
analyst~ focusell on the entire United States. See Frye. ,,·upra note 11. al 59.
26. According lo the CCC':< report, communities with a single ha7ardous waste facility had
twice as many people of color a> did communities without <;uch a facility_ UCC STLDY. ,1upra
note 25, at :<iii. cited in Northern, .>upru note 15, at 500. In alld1t1on, the stully reportell lhal
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The GAO and CCC repons spawned con~idcrable debate about the
inequitable distribution of environ1nental hazards. For exa1nple, in 1990, at a
conference held at the University of Michigan, participants presented various
report~ studying the distribution of environmental hazards by race and
27
incorne. Afterwards, the conference metnbers gave the information co1npilcd
at the conference to then-EPA Adrninistrator William Reilly and urged the
agency to conduct an internal investigation into the rnatter. 28
In l 992. a study published by the National Law Journal (NLJ) reported that
the EPA consi~tently \Va~ negligent in it.~ enforcement effort~ in low-1neo1ne
and minority comniunities. 29 The NU study was based upon finding~ from an
eight-n1onth investigation that focu~ed on the connection between race and
socioeconornic status and the enforcement of environmental law.' 0 The NU
reviewed every environrnental lawsuit filed in the seven years preceding the
study illld every residential toxic waste site included in the Superfund
program.·11
Like any form of discrimination, environ1nental discrimination ha~ been
acknowledged as a n1ajor problein.-12 Legal scholar~ and persons seeking to
combat environ1nental discri1nination have suggested different solutions to the
problem. 33 The next part of the paper deals with the utility of the Equal
cou1muml1e~ with lwo or rnore facilitie-, had n1ore than three lnncs the population of people of
color as co1111n11n1t1e., without such .,it..::s. E'\'VTR0!\\-11-.'.\TAL 1-,QUITY, supra nule 12, § 2.2.1.
27. Paul r>.!ohai & Bunyan Bryant, Fniironniental ln1u.1ti('e. Weii;h1ng Race and C/,,,-, As
Fa<.loro in the /)istrihution of Ln>·ironnwntal l/r1zards, 63 U. Co1.o. L RFV 92 l, 92] ( l 992): ,,·ee
also Joseph Lro;ic, 1\otc, Finding a Re1nedyfor Lrivironm,.ntal Ju.111ce 11\·ing 42 U.S C .9 1983 to
Fill in a Title VI Gap, 53 CASE\\' RLS. L. Ri•v. 497, 499 (2002).
28. ~1oha1 & Bryant, supra note 27, al 499.
29 . .'iee Claire L. Hasler, Couuncnt, The Propooed En•ironmenui/ Justice Act: '·] Have "
(Gr,.en) !Jn-'tlm;· 17 C Pl:(i!·T SOl.l!\D L. R~_v_ 417, 425--427 (1994) (discus~ing finding.., of NIJ
study); see a/_10 Roher! B. Wiygul & Sharon Cl!IT Harrington, J.:nvironmental lu.Hu·e in Rural
Co111n1unitu•s_ Part One: RCRA, Commututies, and Enwro1unental Ju1111:e, 96 V'1 VA. L. RLV.
405, 419 (1993 · 1994).
30. Eileen Gauna, Federal Fnvironmental Citi:;en Provioions: Oh.1tacle.1· and Incentives on
the Road lo Environmental Ju;tu·e, 22 ECOLQ(;y L.Q. I, 18 (1995).
31 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Th,, Ft'deral (;,,vernmenl, m /rs CIPanup of

Hazardous Sites and Its Pursuit of Po/111ter~. Favor~ ~Vh1te Communities over ;\1inonty
Co1nmunllies finder !environmental Law1· Meant to Provide Equal Pro/Pr:llonfor Al/ Ci1izen.1, A
National Uiw .fo11nu1l lnvestigalion Has Found, 15 .\IA r'L L.J .. Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
32. Alice Kaswan, Fnvironmenltll Ju;tice. Rridgmg the Gap Rerween E11vironmen1ul Laws
and "Ju.1·/ice," 47 A.\-1. L' L. R~.V. 221, 222 (1997): see a/so Rnb~rt D. Bullard, Anatomy of
J.:nvirontrlf'ntul Raci1m tl11d the E11v1ronn1ental .fustu:e A1ovenwnt, in (iRASSROOTS, supra note 11,
at 15-39: C.1 TIM~Hll';s ROHERTS & MLLISSA M. Tor+oLON-\1/E!SS, CHRO"IJCLE.\ ~R0\-1 THE
l·.t,;v1RO'.\M!o!\TAL JLiSrICE l'RO/\'TLI"IE 3 -28 (2001); Terence J_ Centner ct al., Environ1ne11tal
Justice and Toxic Releaoeo: EsiabliJ-hinR Evidence of f)iscri1ninarory L'ffect Based on Race and
Not Income, 3 \VIS. ENVTL. L.J. l 19, 120 (1996).
33. See L'rs1c_ supra note 27, at 497; .1ee tliso Jarnes H. Colopy, Note, The Road !Ros
Tr,,ve/ed: Pur;uing Environmental .fusticP 7hrvugh 7it/,.. VI of the (;ivi/ Righl!i Act of !964, 13
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II. "ll!E EQCAL PROTECTION CLACSE

A.

Brief Overview of Relevant F:qual Protection JurisJJrudence

The Fourteenth Amendment specifically empo\'.'ers the federal govern1nent
to act against discriminatory govern1nent actions at the state and local level,
34
particularly tho~e made on the basi~ of race.
According to the Equal
Protection Clause, no state shall "deny to any person within its juri5diction the
equal protection of the laws.'..is ''['f]he purpose of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth A1nendment is to secure every person within the State's
juri5diction against intentional and arbitrary di~crimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents.'' 36 The United States Supreme Court ha~ concluded
that the function of the Equal Protection C:Jause is to ensure that the
government treats "all persons sin1ilarly situated" the ~ame. 37
An equal prote\.:tion claim essentially has two elements: (!)the plaintiff
was treated differently from other similarly situated persons, and (2) this
different treat1nent was motivated by one of the following: (a) an intent to
discriminate on the basis of a characteristic, 5uch as race or religion; (b) an
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution: or (c) a bad faith intent to injure a person. 38 fn an equ<Jl
protection case, after the plaintiff shows that a facially neutral statute has a
disproportionate impact on him, he must prove that the govem1ncnlal decision
rnaker re~punsible for the act causing the adverse impact was tnotivated by an
invidious discriminatory purpose. 39

STAN. EKVTL. L.J. 125 (!994); Benford, supra note 19, al 284--289 (advocating the use of Title
VIII or Che Civil Righrn Ai.:l uf 1968 (Fair Huu5ing Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, co eomhal
en~ironn1cntal d1~cnrninat1on).

34. Comfort ex rel >!c111nyer v. Lynn Sch. Co1nm, 283 f_ Supp. 2d 328, 391 {D. Mass.
2003).
35. CS_ COKST. ainend. XIV,§ 1: see also Bluitt v. Iluustun lndep. Sch. Di>t., 236 F. Supp.
2d 703. 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
36. Vil!. uf V·/illowbruok v. Olcch. 528 C.S. 562, 564 (2000) (4uoting Sioux Cit} Hndgc Co.
~.Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
37. City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 C.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that
"[L]he E4ual Protection Clause of the l•ourtccnth Amendment command<, that no State shall 'deny
ID any person within its juri<,dJCtion the equal protection of the laws,' "'1h1ch is es>ent1ally a
direction that all persons >uni!arly situated should be 1realed alike.").
38 See Diesel v Town of l.cwi~boro, 232 F 3d 92. 103 (2d Cir. 2U!Xl) (quoting T.eClair ~.
Snundcrs, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980)).
39. See United States v. J[are, 3081'. Supp. 2d 955, 991 (D. !\ch 2004).
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The courts have acknowledged intentional discrimination in three contexts.
First, courts have been willing to find discriminatory intent in those cases
40
where a law or policy has expressly categorized citizens on the basis of race.
In addition, courts have found discriminatory intent in situations where a
facially neutral law or policy has been applied differently to citizens because of
their race. 41 Finally, courts have noted that discriminatory intent may exist
when a facially neutral law or policy, that has been applied evenhandedly, was
42
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a racially discriminatory impact.
The Supreme Court has structured its equal protection analysis by
establishing the following three levels of review for challenges to govem1nent
supported actions: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. 43
"When a legislative enactment has been challenged on equal protection
grounds, one standard of review is rational basis review, which requires that
the law be rationally related to a legitimate govern1nent interest." 44 ·rhe
rational basis test is the lowest level of review. Thus, governmental decisions
analyzed under the rational basi~ test arc a\Jnost always upheld. ·rhe rational
basis test is applied to cases where the challenged activity did not impact a
person in a protected class or undenninc a fundarncnta! right. 45
The Supreme Court has al~o developed an intermediate level of ~crutiny
that lies "lbletv.'een [the] extremes of rational basis review and strict
46
scrutiny ...." ·rypically, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny when it has
to review laws that impact quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or
47
age. When a classification affects "suspect clas~es" of persons or burdens a
fundamental right, "strict scrutiny" applies and a con1pclling governmental
interest must be shown to justify the classification.~ 8 Strict scrutiny is such a
high standard that its application usually results in a victory for the plaintiff.
The standard is applied whenever a 1ncmber of a suspect class can prove
discriminatory intent. 49 Therefore, in order to have any level of success,

40. See 1-:Iunt v. Cromartie, 526 US 541, 546 (1999).
41 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, l 18 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1886).
42. See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. l!ous. Dev. Corp., 429 lJ.S. 252, 264 65 (1977).
43. Goulart v. Meadows. 220 F. Supp. 2d 494. 501 (D. Md. 2002); ;ee al:,·o Darren Lenard
llutch1nson, '"Unexplaim1b/e on (;round.1 Other Than Race""· The Inversion of Privilege and
Subordination in Equal Protection Juri.\prudenre, U ILL. L Rrv. 6 l 5, 633--634 (2003).
44. Ran1os v. rown ofVcnion, 353 F.3d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2003)
45. Se-e id., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3<l 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000).
46. Clark v. Jeter, 486 L'.S. 456, 461 (1988).
47. See lJnite<l States v. Coleman, !66 f-.3d 428, 411 (2<l Cir. 1999) (per cunani); see a/;o
Craig v. Boren, 429 C.S. 190, 197 ( 1976).
48. United Stales v. Extreme A<;1,oes., lne., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (2005).
49. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995).
!T]hc purpose of strid .1crutiny i.1 to ··snmke out" illegitimate use~ of race hy a.'>.',uring that
[a 1tate actor] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly su~pect tool.
The te~t also ensure> that the means cho>cn "fit'" thi'> compelling goal so closely that there
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environmental discrimination plaintiffs must prove that deci.'iions to place
environmental hazards in their communities ~'ere motivated by racial
considerations. To meet their burden of proof, those plaintiffs must have
. . f
. ;o
access to quaI tty 1n onnat1on.

B.

Setninal Equal 1~rotection Cases

Equal Protection litigation is controlled by two seminal Supreme Court
decision.'>: Washington v. Davis, 51 and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 52
In Davis, Harley and Sellers, two black men, unsuccessfully applied to
become police officers in Washington, D.C. 53 Their applications were rejected
becau~e they did not pass a written personnel test. 54 Harley and Sellers filed a
lawsuit alleging that the police department's recruiting procedures, including
the written personnel test, were racially discriminatory in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmcnt. 55 Instead of claiming intentional
discrimination, the plaintiffs contended that the written test bore no
relationship to job performance and had a discriminatory effect of screening
out black applicants. 56
The district court n1ade three key conclusions. The first two conclusions
the court made were that the number of blacks on the police force was not
proportionate to the racial content of the city and that more blacks flunked the
test than white applicants:' 7 The court also determined that the police
department did not validate the test to gauge if it was a reliable indicator of job
performance. 58 Nonethele.'is, the district court refused to find intentional
discri1nination on the part of the police department and granted the
department's summary judgment motion.' 9
In reaching its decision, the district court was influenced by the fact that
(I) 44o/o of the new police recruit.'> were black~, a percentage that was
proportionate to the number of blacks on the police force and equal to the
number of 20~ to 29-year-old blacks located in the recruiting area; (2) the

i'> linlc or no possibility that the motive for the clao·:,ification was 1llcgit1matc racial
prejudice or stereotype.
Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S 469, 493 (1989)) (c1nphasis added).
50. The value of information will be discu.'>scd in a later section.
51 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
53. !Javi1, 426 t:.s. at 232-33.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. fd. at 235.
'57. Id.
58. Davis, 426 US. at 235
59. Id.
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police department had affirmatively recruited blacks and had many pass the
test, but then fail to report for duty; and (3) the test was a useful indicator of
training school performance and was not designed to, and did not, discriminate
against olhcrwise qualified hlacks. 60
In an opinion written by Justice \Vhite, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's verdict because it concluded that the written test
was facially neutral. 61 'fhe Court decided that the disproportionate impact of
the test on black applicants did not necessitate a finding that the test was a
62
purposely discriminatory devicc.
In order to justify its decision, the Court
asserted that a governmental action is not unconstitutional just because it has a
disparate impact upon the members of a minority group. 63 1'he Court reasoned
that "fd_lisproportionate i1npact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discri1nination forbidden by the
64
Constitution. "
Since Davis, it has been understood that a facially neutral govern1nental
action may be constitutionally valid even if it disproportionally impacts racial
1ninorities. However, if the evidence shows that an "invidious discriminatory
purpose" was a rnotivating factor behind the action, the government has lhe
burden of proving that the action was taken using racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures. 65 Therefore, in order to prove that the law or
government action violates the Equal Protection Clause, a person must trace
the disparate impact to a discriminatory purpose. 66
In light of the /Javis decision, to be successful, environmental
discrimination plaintiffs must show that the placement of the environmental
ha/_ard in their community was n101ivatcd by intentional discrimination. A
person who 5eeks recovery under a theory of purposeful discrimination must
den1onstrate that the governmental authority implerncnted the facially neutral
policy being challenged '"because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."' 67 After Davi.1, it was clear that in order to
bring a successful equal protection case the plaintiff had to prove that the
governtnent decision-maker was rnotivated by discrin1inatory intent. 68 A few
years later, the United States Supreme Court used a case involving a denial of a
rezoning request to build low- and moderate-income housing to elaborate upon

60 fd_ at 235- 36_
61 Id. at 246,
62_ Id.
63. Davis, 246 U.S. at 242.
64. Id.
65. Id at 241-42.
66. John~nn "- Go;crnor ofrla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1310 (I Ith Cir. 2003)_
67. Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic As>'n. 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir_ 2002) {quoting
Personnel Adm'r of VJ ass. v. Feeney. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))_
68. Davi:i, 426 U.S_ at 239.
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69

its Davis decision.
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court
concluded that if a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind a
challenged activity, it may be shown by the introduction of circumstantial
rather than direct evidence.70
In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested the
following relevant factor~ to use as evidcntiary sources: (I) the level of impact
the governmental deci~ion has on different race~ (v.·bether the action bears
71
n1ore heavily on one race than the other); (2) the historical background of the
decision (whether there was a series of governmental actions taken for
72
invidious purposes); (3) the sequence of events occurring prior to the
chal!enged action (whether there were departures, ~ubstantive or procedural,
from the normal deci5ion-making procc~s); 73 and (4) the legislative or
adrninistrative history of the challenged activity (whether a review of the
contemporary statements made by the decision-makers, the minutes of the
meetings regarding the challenged decision, or the reports pertaining to the
challenged decision indicate any type of unfair purpose). 74 In addition to the
above-mentioned factors, the foreseeability of the adverse consequences may
have some bearing on the existence of discriminatory intent. 75
If a facially neutral law is administered in a way that reveal~ an
overwhelming pattern of di~crimination, the pattern of discrimination itself
may be enough for the court to infer discriminatory intent. This i~ especially
true in ca~es where a pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the challenged govem1nental action. 76 Courts have cmphasi/ed
that "[e]specially strong statistical proof may be sufficient to draw an inference
of discriminatory intent .
" 77
For example, in .,,ome cases, the governmental entity has engaged in a
pattern of discrimination so blatant that the Court has found discriminatory
purpose based solely on the pattern. This proposition is illustrated by the legal

69.
70_
71
72.

Vil!. of Arlington Heights v. .\1c1ro. llous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252 (1977)
id_ at 266----07.

id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
71 Id.
74. Arlington Heights. 492 US_ at 268.
75_ See Personnel Adrn'r ufMa~~- v Feeney, 442 U.S 256, 279 n.25 (1979)_ In addrcs>ing
the foreseeability aspect of discruninatory intent, the Court stated that discriminatory intent
"1n1plic., more than in1cn1 as vo!it1un ur intent a<; awarenc><; of consequences_ It implic<; that the
dcci>ion1naker ... selected ur rcaffirn1cd a panicular course uf actiun al least in part 'bccau~e uf.'
not merely 'in spile of,' 1ls adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279 (cilaliun
omincd); see ab.o Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remed}1ng Enviro11mental Racis1n, 90 MICI!. L. REV_
394, 409~ 10 ( [ 991 )_
76. See Turner v_ Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360----61 (1970): seeafao Sirns v_ (icorg1a, 389 U.S.
404, 407---08 ( 1967)_
77. Anderson v. ComeJo, 284 F_ Supp. 2d 1008, 1050 (l\.D Ill. 2003).
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analysis in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 78 In that case, a city ordinance prohibited
laundries from operating in wooden buildings without the consent of the city's
board of supervisors. 79 At that time, there were approximately 320 laundries in
the city and county of San Francisco; 310 of those laundries were constructed
of wood.~° Chinese residents owned 240 of the 320 laundries. 81 The Chinese
residents unsuccessfully petitioned the city's board of supervisors for
permission to continue operating their wooden laundries. 82 Nonetheless, all of
the white residents (except for one woman) who requested permission to
continue operating their wooden laundries were granted exemptions from the
ordinance. 83
l"he Court stated: "l"he fact that the right to give consent is reserved in the
ordinance shows that carrying on the laundry business in wooden buildings is
not deemed of itself necessarily dangerous."&4 Based upon that observation,
the Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinance was .~ither to close most
of the Chinese laundries or to drive the Chinese out of the 2ity and county of
San Francisco. 85 According to the Court, although the law was facially neutral,
the public authority applied it with "an evil eye and an unequal hand." 86
'J"hercfore, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on the
city"s discriminatory application of its mandates. 87
Another case decided on the basis of statistics was (Iomillion v.
Lightjbot. 88 Gomillion involved an evaluation of the validity of Local Act No.
140. That law, which \Vas passed by the Alabama Legislature, redefined the
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee. 89 Prior to the passage of the statute, the
city was square in shape, but as a result of the statute's mandates the shape of
90
the city was changed into a strangely irregular twenty~eight-sided figure.
The ultimate impact of the law was to remove all except four or five of the
black citizens from the city. 91 On the contrary, not a single white resident was

78. 118 U.S. 356 (1886): see a/.10 Da•1d Cnunp, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The
Paradox oj Purpose/e;sness 1n the Constitutional Racial Di;crimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L.
RFV. 285, 289-291 (1998).
79. Yi<'/.:. Wv. 118 U.S. at 358.
80. Id. at 359.
81 Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Yick Wa.118 U.S. at361.
85. Id at 363.
86. Id. at 373-74.
87. Id. at 363
88. 364 U.S. 339 (!960).
89. Id. at 340.
90. Id. at 341.
91

Id.
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removed from the city. 92 Therefore, the result of the Act was to deprive blacks
of the benefits of living in the city, including the right to vote in city
93
elections.
After the passage of the statute, a group of black city residents filed an
action claiming that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution.94 The district court granted the city's motion for dismissal
because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and the
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 95 The
United States Supreme Court held that the Jaw was probably unconstitutional,
so the petitioners were entitled to prove their allegations at triai. 96 In reaching
its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the act did not appear to be an
ordinary geographic redistricting measure. Instead, the Supreme Court noted
that it would be easy to conclude that the law was "tantamount . . . to a
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with
segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so
as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." 97
Cases like the ones discussed above are rare and have been nonexistent in
the environmental discrimination context. As a result, the establishment of
intent as the standard for proving discrimination has placed an onerous burden
on plaintiffs. In order to be successful, these plaintiffs have to introduce
evidence showing that the governmental action was clearly motivated by
discriminatory considerations.
A central reason why plaintiffs in
environmental discrimination cases have been unable to meet their burden of
proof is the lack of access to quality information. As the results of the
environmental discrimination cases discussed in the next section indicate,
infonnation is a vital component of putting forth a successful case.
Ill. CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE INTENT STANDARD IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCRIMINATION CASES

The following three cases illustrate how the Equal Protection doctrine has
been interpreted in cases involving the placement of environmentally
hazardous facilities in predominately minority communities. In each case, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, citing an absence of clear
evidence of discriminatory intent on the pare of the decision-maker. Even
though the evidence of disparate impact was clear and acknowledged by some

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

id.

Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 347-48_
Id. at 341.
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of rhe couns, rhe courts' adherence to the intent requirement prevented the
plaintiffs from prevailing. 98 In each case, the plaintiffs' inability to prove
purposeful and conscious intent to discriminate on the part of the decision
makcr prevented them from winning their Equal Protection challenge.

A.

Bean v. Southivestem Waste Management Corp. 99

In Bean, the plaintiffs sued to contest the Texas Department of Health's
decision to grant a permit to Southwestern Waste Management to place a solid
waste facility in the East Houston-Dyersda\c Road area in Hani~ County. 100
The plaintiffs claimed that the decision was motivated by racial discrimination
because the city had a history of placing solid wa~te sites in black
101
neighborhoods.
·rhe plaintiffs relied upon statistical data to show a pattern of racial
discrimination in the state agency's placement of solid waste sites in minority
communities. 102 The first set of data supplied by the plaintiffs dealt with the
two solid wastes sites that the City of Houston planned to use. 103 The plaintiffs
contended that the selection of those two sites was discriminatory because the
area contained lOOo/o of the type-one landfills used by the City of Houston, and
only 6.9% of the entire population of the city. 104 The Court found that
argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned that, because
only two sites were involved. the data was statistically insignificant. HIS
Second, the Court determined that, of the two proposed sites, one was in a
primarily white censu~ tract and the other was in a primarily minority census
tract. 106 Therefore, race was probably not a consideration when the city chose
107
the two sites.
The second set of data the plaintiff~ submitted focused on the total number
of solid waste ),ites located in the proposed target area. 108 The plaintiffs noted
that the t<irget area contained 15o/o of the city's solid waste sites, but only 6.9o/o
of its population. 109 The plaintiffs argued that most of the solid waste sites
98. See Hrian 1-'acrstcin, Co1n1ncnt, Resurrrrling t.'qual Protecrion Cha/lenge.1 to
Fnvirunmental Inequity: A f)e/ibera/p/y Indifferent Opt1m1stic Approach, 7 lL PA. J_ CONS! L
561, 566---569 (2004) (discu.,~ing ca.,es where the plaintiffs attempted tu u>e the Equal Protection
Clau>e to challenge in<lu..,Lrial . . iling <lec1s1ons).
99. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
100. Id. at fi74 75.
IOI. Id. at 675.
102. Id. at 678.
103. Id.
Hl4. lirun. 482 F. Slipp. at 678.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Beun, 482 F Sllpp. at 678.
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were placed in that area because it had a 70% minority population. 110 The
court decided that the placement of so many solid waste sites in the target area
had nothing to do with race because it was reasonable to place the sites in an
111
area that was sparsely populated.
In addition, the court concluded that race
was not a factor in the placement of the sites because half of the sites in the
target area were in census tracts with more than a 70o/o white population. 112
The third set of data put forth by the plaintiffs considered the city as a
whole. The data showed that only 32.4% of the sites were located in the
western half of the city where 73.4% of the whites lived. 113 In addition,
according to the data, 67 .6% of the sites were located in the eastern half of the
city where 61.6% of the minority population resided. 114 The court disagreed
with the plaintiffs' interpretation of the data. After analyzing the data relying
on census tracts instead of halves or quadrants of the city, the court stated that
"[t]he difference between the racial composition of census tracts in general and
the racial composition of census tracts with solid waste sites is ... only
115
0.3%."
The court found that small difference to be statistically
. . .fi1cant. '"
1ns1gn1
After evaluating all of the statistical evidence, the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument and held that, although the siting decision appeared to be
"unfortunate and insensitive" the plaintiffs had not proven that the state
officials had a discriminatory intent. 117 The court pointed out several
weaknesses in the plaintiffs' evidence. Regarding the statistical data, the court
indicated that neighborhood data, as opposed to census tract data, would have
been more forceful if the plaintiffs had shown that sites located in
predominately white census tracts were in minority neighborhoods. 118
Moreover, the court found that the non-statistical data was inadequate to show
119
The court stated that, in its opinion, there were too
discriminatory intent.
many unanswered questions, including how sites were selected and what
factors were used in the placement of the sites. 120

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
! 17.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678.
Id. at 679.
Id.
id. at 680.
Id.
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679-80.
Id. at 680.
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East Bibb Twiggs 1VeighborhoodAss'n v. lltfacon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission 121

The minority plaintiffs in East Bibb sought to reverse a decision by the
local planning board to locate a landfill in a predominately black
community. 122 In the case, Mullis Tree Service, Inc. and Robert Mullis applied
to the Commission for a conditional use permit to operate a non-putrescible
waste landfill in a census tract containing 5,527 people. 123 Of these residents,
124
3,367 were black and 2,149 were white.
The Commission initially voted to
125
deny the application.
However, after rehearing the matter, the Commission
approved the final site plan for the landfill and issued a conditional use permit
to Mullis. 126
Analyzing the pennit decision, the court applied the Arlington Heights
five-part test to detennine whether the plaintiffs' evidence supported a finding
of discriminatory intent. 127 After reviewing all of the evidence, the court
concluded that the Commission's decision to approve the conditional use
permit was not motivated by the intent to discriminate against blacks. 128 The
court noted that, since the census tract contained a majority black population,
the decision to approve the placement of the landfill in that area had a greater
impact on blacks than it did on whites. 129 Therefore, the court conceded that
there was glaring evidence of disparate impact. 130 Nevertheless, according to
the court, there were "no specific antecedent events which support a
determination that race was a motivating factor in the Commission's
131
In making that determination, the court emphasized that the only
decision."
other Commission-approved landfill was located in a predominately white
132
census tract.
The court's opinion did offer environmental discrimination plaintiffs some
guidance. The trial judge noted that the local Commission could not "actively
solicit this or any other landfill application," 133 and the opinion hinted that
sudden changes in zoning or relaxations in procedure would be considered

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
13 !.
132.
133.

706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882.

Easr Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 883.
Id. at 884.
Id
Id.
Id.

East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
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134

highly suspect.
The court determined that evidence of past discriminatory
decisions by agencies other than the county planning commission wa5
irrelevant to the discrimination issue it was eonsidering. 135 Therefore, courts
may refuse to consider the general state or city history of racism and
segregation. However, the court did not rule out the possibility of considering
past decisions by the Commission that had resulted in a disparate impact on the
.
.
.
ll~
m1nor1ty community. ·

c.

R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay 137

In R.l.S.t."., a hi-racial citizen group challenged the decision or the local
county hoard to site a landfill in a predominately black comrnunity in
Virginia. 138 Since the landfills in King and Queen County did not meet the
~tate'~ new environmental standards, the Board of Supervisors negotiated with
the Chesapeake Corporation for a joint venture landfill. 1-1 4 During the summer
of 1988. after (:hesapeake abandoned the negotiations, the board decided to
14
purchase property from Chesapeake to use as a landfill site.
Chesapeake
offered the board the choice of buying either the Piedmont Tract or the
Nonnan-Saunders Tract. 141 The board ~elected the Piedmont Tract because
tests showed that it was suitable for use as a landfill. 142 After several public
hearings, n1embers of the Board unanimously voted to buy the Piedmont Tract
143
for use as a i<mdfill.
1'he me1nbers of the conununity where the proposed landfill was to be
located opposed the project. 144 l'o hear the concerns of the residents, 5everal
board me1nhers attended a meeting organized by Reverend Taylor, pastor of
Second Mt. ()Jive Baptist C:hurch. 1 ~ 5 The persons ohjecting to the project were
worried that if the landfill \Vas placed in their neighborhood ( l) their quality of
life would he diminished; (2) their property values would he lowered; (3) their
worship and 5ocial functions at Second Mt. ()Jive Bapti~t Church would be
disrupted; (4) the grave sites on the church ground~ would be damaged; (5)

°

134.
135.
136.
137.
I38.
139
140
141
142.
143.
144.
145.

Iri. at 886.
Id. al 885.
East IJ1bb, 706 f'. Supp. at 885.

768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
/d.atll48.
Iri. al 1146.
Id. al 1147.
id. al 1146.
R.l.S.E., 768 f'. Supp. at 1146).
ld.atll47.
Id.
id.
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local access road~ would have to be improved; and (6) the historic church 14 r'
147
and community would be harmed.
In light of the fact that the three other landfills in the area were all in
neighborhoods that were at least ninety-five percent black and that the county
had previously refused to ,.itc a landfill in u predominately white
neighborhood, the court acknowledged that the landf11l had a disproportionate
impact upon the black community. 14 ~ Nonetheless, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not satisfied the remainder of the discriminatory purpo~e
149
equation and rejected the Equal Protection claim.
The court was influenced by the board's need to decide quickly on a
150
location for the landfill.
The board's prior atte1npt to buy landfill space had
been unsuccessful. 151
Because the Piedmont Tract had been found
environmental!y suitable for the purpose of the landfill development. instead of
looking at other possible locations, the board took immediate 5teps to acquire
the property. 152 Moreover, the court seemed to give some weight to the fact
that the board 1naking the siting decision contained three white men1bers and
153
two black members.
further, the court appeared to suspect R.I.S.E:s
motives in bringing a discrimination action to challenge the siting deci~ion.
The court stated that "[r]ace discrimination did not become a significant public
issue until it appeared that the initial thrust was failing." 154 ·rhe court's
~kepticism was probably based upon the fact that R.I.S.E. reco1n1nended a
replacement site that was located in a predominately black area. 155

D.

Cornponents of a Successful Environ1nental [Jiscrimination Case

The intent requirement has been a major stumbling block for
environmental discrimination plaintiffs seeking relief under the Equal
Protection Clausc. 156 Nonetheless, the courts have acknowledged that if the
plaintiffs present the correct type of circumstantial evidence, they can prevail
using the Equal Protection Clause. The courts have given no indication that
they will substitute the intent requirement for a lesser standard. 157 In order to

In 1869. freed '>laves hu1lt the Second \1t. Olive Baptist Church. Id.
R.l.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at l 147.
fd. at 1148--49.
/d.atll49.
Id. at 1150.
Id.
R.l.S.f;, 768 F. Supp. at 1150.
id at 1146.
Id.al 1148.
Id.
See Richan! J. Lazarus. Pur.~umg "f."nvlfonmPnta! Justice": The Di>trihutiona/ t.ffecrs of
Environmental Protec1ion, 87 Nw. lJ. L Ri 0 v 787, 829-33 (1993).
157 Cox v. City of Jackson. 343 F. Supp. 2d 546, 570 (S.D. M1o;s. 2004).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
l:'i4.
155.
156.

s,,,,
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meet lhe burden of proof, under the currcnl sy~tem, plainli!Ts must have acces5
to information. l"herefore, persons fighling environmental discrimination
should take sleps to gather the information necessary to prove discriminatory
intent.
In light of the ca~e precedenl, thi~ section is an attempt to de1nonstrate the
important role that information plays in preparing a successful equal protection
action in the environmental discrimination context. The starting point in
preparing an Equal Protection case is still the Arlington Heights factors. 158
·rherefore, the focus of the discus~ion is upon the criteria established by that
case. A multi-factor approach similar to the one adopted here has been taken
by others. 1'w 'fhe factors dealing with events leading up to the decision and the
legislative and administrative history of the decisions are combined.
I.

Disparate Impact

The first thing an environmental discrimination plaintiff needs to establish
160
is the existence of racially disparate impact.
In order to be successful, it is
important for the plaintiff to have good statistical data. According to Bradford
Mank, the selection of the population sample for comparison impacts the
disparate impact analysis. Mank further asserts that, in order to prove
disparate impact, the plaintiff must compare the demographics of those in the
adversely affected area with others in the area who are not impacted by the
161
The effort and expense involved in gathering data often leads
decision.
plaintiffs to conduct their analyses using "pre-ordained units of [population]
cornparison, such as census tracts or zip codes." 162 Census data is often used
because it is readily available in paper and computerized fonns. 16:1 The EPA
suggests the use of census data to classify the population in the affected area
with regards to race, ethnicity, economic, and educational demographics. 1M
However, the agency cautions that census data may not be accurate in so1ne

158. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. 'Vletro_ Hous Dev_ Corp, 429 US_ 252. 266----68 (1977).
159. See e.g., 1\licc Ka,wan, L"nvrronmental Ww: Grist For The Equal Protection 1\1il/, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 387, 411-426 (1999).).
160. Ea>t Bibb Twigg> Neighborhrxxl Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Y,oning
Comm'n, 706 F_ Supp 880, 884 (M [)_Ga_ 1989)_
161 Bradford C_ Mank, Proving an E11vironme111al Ju11ice Case: Veten11ini11g an
Appropriate Cornparifon Popularion, 20 VA. EKVTL. L.J. 365, 383 (200 l ).
162 Id. al 410, oee afao EPA GL"IDA'.'ICE, supra note 9, at§ 2_1_2 (stating that data obtained
from the cen~us is one of Che n1ost conunon types of inforrnation used to deterrnine the minority
status of a connnunity)_
163. The EPA opine' that the availahihty of census demographic information in digiti7ed
forn1at can he helpful when analyzing environmental JU>lice issue>. EPA GL"IDANCE, IHlpra note
9.at§5.1
164 Id_

SAINT LOUIS U.IV!VJ:.R5fTY LAW JOURNA!.

490

[Vol SO 469

16

cases ·' One possible cause of this deficiency 1s the fact that census data is
the result of self-reporting. 166
In most instances, such as in the Rean case, this type of analysis presents
problcms. 167 In that case, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' case might
have been stronger if they had submitted neighborhood data as opposed to
census tract data. 168 The census tract data presented did not provide a true
picture of the conununity affected by the proposed landfill. Jn justifying its
decision not to find a discriminatory purpose, the court noted that the county's
other landfill was located in a predominately white census tracl. 169
In order to obtain better information to submil to the court about the
compo~ition of the community, the plaintiffs should use olhcr methods. For
instance, they rnay be able to get information from local resources by asking
170
questions, conducting interviews, and doing research.
Additionally, the
171
plaintiffs can use a geographic information system (GIS)
or a similar
mapping system to identify the location and percentage of the minority persons
in the comn1unity. 172
·rhe EPA has acknowledged that maps, aerial
photographs, and GIS can be used to discover geographic areas where possible
.
I JUStJce
. . concerns su h s1st.
. 113
envtronmenta
It appears that the plaintiffs will have a better claim if they are able to
show, for example, that the area i1nmediately surrounding the proposed facility
is composed alniost exclusively of minority residents and that the population
heco1nes whiter as the distance fron1 the facility increa<;es. Hence, in order to
obtain the most useful data, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should use
an analytic method that analyzes demographic~ in terms of proximity to the
proposed hafard. 174
The effects of an environmental hazard frequently occur in inverse
proportion to the distance from the location or site of the hazard. 175 For

165. See 1d. at§ 2.l.2. "[!]! 1nay be nece~sary for the EPA NEPA analyst to validate !census]
infonnation with the llSC of additional sources." fd. ··The additional methods
include
contacting 101.:al resources, govcrnn1enl agencies, conuncrcial database firms, and the use of
locat1onal/d1stributional tool5" Id.
Hi6. Id. at§ 5.1
167. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp. 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 678.
l 70. See generally EPA GLIDANCE, Jupra nolc 9, at§§ 2.1.2, 5.1.
171. GIS systcn1s are geographic references or co1nputcrized atlases. See id. at § 5. I.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Richard D. Gragg, III ct al., The Location and Co1nmunity Denwgraphics af
Targe1ed Enwronmen1a/ HazardvuJ· Sites in Floridt1, 12 J. LAJ\'D USE & ENVTl.. L. I, 12-14
( 1996) (describing a study conducted in fifteen Florida counties).
175. See Juha B. Latham Worshain, Disparate !1npact l .uw:n1i1J· Uruler "fitle VI, Section 602:
Con a l.ega/ Taul Build l~nv1ronmen/11l .!u.\lice 1, 27 B.C. ENVTL. Aff. L. REV. 631, 649 (2000)
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example, the closer the minority population is to the ha.lard, the greater the
likelihood that those persons will be advcr5ely impacted. Thus, proximity to
the environmental hazard usually correlates with the probability that the
minority population will be disproportionately affected by the location of the
176
As a consequence, if environmental discrimination advocates can
hazard.
show that minority persons in the community live nearest to the environmental
hazard, they may have a better chance of proving disparate impact.
Commentators have suggested the use of "maps, aerial photographs, and
information databases" in order to identify the communities that are within
177
close proximity of the proposed project.
2.

Historical Background

In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested that courts look to the
role of historical discrimination tu determine discriminatory intent. 178 The
court in £ast Bibb, however, stated that it would only consider relevant
discrimination perpetrated by the particular government agency that made the
decision being challenged by the plaintiffs. 179 In the context of ha.£ardous
waste sitings, the agencies are usually newly created, so they may have no
history of discrimination. 1·hereforc, environrncntal discrimination plaintiffs
will be at a ~ubstantial disadvantage when trying to gather the information
necessary to prove discriminatory intent.
Furthermore, it appears that the courfs focus may be even narrower than
the action~ of the agency involved in the case. For in5tance, in R.l.S.E., while
analyzing the past siting decisions of the board, the court pointed out which
present board members had been involved in 1naking those decisions. 180
Consequently, il is possible that the plaintiffs could prove di~criminatory intent
in past siting decisions by the agency at issue, and still fail, if the current
mernbers were not a part of the agency at the time those siting decisions were
made.
(citing EPA, IKTERIM GL'lDANCI·. !·OR INVl'-~TIGATING TITLE VI AD\.llNISTRATlVE COMl'LAI'>J IS
CHALl.E:-IGl;>;G PERMITS (1998), and ~taring lhal the identity of the population affected is
"generally detennined by proximity to the fac1hty").
176. Graggetal.,;upranute 174,at 16-17.
177. Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. 1--'crguson, The '"lfurnan Environment" Requirement of
the National 1,·n,ironnienta/ Pu/l(:yArt: lmp/1ca1ionsfor Environmenral JusrJce, 1997 DErROJTC.
I.. \1JCH. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1165 (1997); see a/;-u EPA GUIDANCE. J"upra note 9, at§ 5.1. Local
maps and aerial photographs may give a "snap shot," or big picture of where low-income and
minority per~on-. are located in the area and their proximity to the proposed project. Id. They
may aho be used lo identify important natural resources that n1ay be affected hy the proposed
project. Id.
178. Vil!. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252, 267-68 (1976).
179. East Hibb Twiggs Ncighhorhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Con1m'n, 706 F Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
180. R.1.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991)
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One potential solution to the problem is for the plaintiffs to have
background checks conducted on the individual agency members to determine
their attitudes toward racial minorities. This information may also he gained
by searching old newspapers. 181 Another potential source of this type of
information is minutes from agency meetings or pubic hearings. If the
plaintiffs arc able to discover insensitive remarks the members have made in
their public and/or private capacity, they may be ahlc to convince the court that
the rcrnarks are relevant to show that racial discrimination affected the
agency's decision-making process. In addition, the plaintiffs n1ay strengthen
their case if they can show that an agency n1en1bcr's past behavior indicates
that he or ~he has a tendency to disregard the concern~ of the minority
community (e.g., a~sociating with a business venture that exploits minorities).
The racial composition of the dccision-rnaking body may also come into
play under this factor. This seemed to carry some weight in R.l.S.J::. Jn that
case, when finding no discriminatory purpose, the court emphasized that the
board making the decision contained two black mcmbers. 182 The court's
reliance on that fact to support its finding of no discriminatory purpose is
flawed for two reasons. First, the court did not consider the fact that the black
1nembers on the board were out-numbered three to two. 18 _i Thus, even if both
black members had voted against the siting decision. the permit probably
would have still been approved. Second, the court's reasoning presupposes
that blacks are not capable of intentionally discriminating against other blacks.
It is entirely possible for an all rninority deci~ion-making body to intentionally
184
discriminate against a predominantly minority community.
In addition, the
court noted that the two black members were elected to the board in a special
election, afler the federal government ordered a redistricting. 185 The fact that
the election was ordered should have indicated to the court that some type of
racial ten~ion might have exi~ted in the county.

181. See Fu.1·t Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885. The court was w1lhng 10 read newspaper article<; to
gel historical background on dcci51on-makcrs. Id.
!82 R.!.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at l 146 (noting the racial composition of the hoard).
183. See id.
184. See Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
/\1arshall slated·
Social scientists agree that mcn1bers of nunonty groups frequently respond to
discri1nination and prejudice hy at1c1npting to d1sa.'>sociate them.'>clvcs from the group.
even to the point of adopting the 1najority's negative altitude~ to\vards the minority. Such
behavior occur~ with p:ut1cular frequency an1ong rnembcr<, of n1inonty group.'> who have
achieved son1e 1ne;isure of econorn1c or political succeo~ and thereby have gained sorne
acceptability arnong the do1ninanl group.
Id.
185. R.l.S.E., 768 f<. Supp. at 1146.
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Departures from Procedure

The East Bibb plaintiffs argued that the Commission had deviated from its
normal procedures in several ways: the Commission urged participation from
the city and county, it granted a rehearing after the petition for a landfill was
186
denied, and it made certain findings of fact.
The court acknowledged that
the Comntission had departed somewhat from the norm, but did not identify
187
any procedural flaws.
However, the court did analyze the reasons behind
the procedural changes and indicated that sudden changes in procedure would
be given a hard look. 188
Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should gather
information to familiarize themselves with the agency's decision-making
procedures by attending meetings dealing with the placement of environmental
hazards, reading the agency's regulations or bylaws, and looking through
minutes of agency meetings. To support their assertions, the plaintiffs need to
present evidence that the decision-making body deviated from its normal
practices when it decided to approve the placement of an environmental hazard
in their community. This will shift the burden to the agency to justify its
actions. Moreover, if the agency has no independent siting criteria, the
plaintiff should point that out to the court. The lack of objective criteria for
making placement decisions may indicate that the decision-makers were
subjective in the selection process. As a result, the courts may be more willing
to find discriminatory intent.
4.

Events Prior to the Decision

The court may be willing to infer discriminatory intent from relevant
actions that occurred before the agency decided to place the environmental
hazard in a minority neighborhood. For example, in Bean, the court stated that
it would have been helpful to know the initial reason the chosen site was
selected for consideration. 189 In addition, the East Bibb court opined that it
would not be proper for the decision-making agency to actively solicit an
application to place a site in a certain neighborhood. 190
Hence, the
environmental discrimination plaintiff should do discovery as soon as possible
to try to find information about the selection process. 191 If plaintiffs are able to
prove that the selection of the minority neighborhood was anything but

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
case).

East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886.

Id.

See id.
Bean v. Sw. Wa<;te Mgmt. Corp, 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
East Bibb, 706 F_ Supp. at 885.
See Bean, 482 F_ Supp. at 680 (noting that extensive discovery was not conducted in chis
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random, the court may be more willing to question the motives of the decision
makcrs.
The plaintiff should also try to show that at the time the site was
considered the agency members knew that the disparate impact would occur
because they were aware that the affected community \Vas already substantially
burdened by environmental hazards. It must be noted, however, that in
response to that argument, the court in Bean stated that a sample of two ~ites
192
wa~ not a sufficient database to create a statistically significant result.
To
avoid thut problem, the plaintiffs should focus on other types of environmental
hazards in addition to the type at issue.
For instance, the affected
neighborhood may already have major highways running through it, an airport
nearby, and several industrial plants located within it. Recognizing that the
agency knew that the affected neighhorhood already contained these hazards
before it made its siting decision n1ay 1nake the court view the decision more
critically.
Another factor that the court considered relevant in t,-a.1t Bihh was the fact
that the county had previously refused to site the landfill at the approved site,
and it had apparently not considered siting the landfill in a predominately
white neighborhood. 1Y3 Consequently, the plaintiffs n1ay have a strong case for
discriminatory intent if they are able to show that the siting agency did not
consider any suitable predorninately white neighborhoods as a potential
location for the environmental hazard.
5.

Other Considerations

·rhe for1nula for proving intent in an environrnental discrimination case
conies down to the plaintiffs obtaining good infor1nation, including statistical
and scientific data, by conducting thorough discovery and utilizing other
investigative techniques. The need for presenting good statistical data has
been addressed in the previous section. Thus, the focus of this section is on the
need for good science.
Good scientific testing will enable the plaintiffs to determine if the
proposed site is environmentally suitable for the proposed use. It will also
allow the plaintiffs to discover if there arc other locations in non-minority
neighborhoods that could accommodate the proposed project. Additionally,
the plaintiffs will take a big step toward proving a discriminatory purpose if
they find a site in the area that is alrnost identical, but for racial composition, to
the one selected. Having the scientific expertise will assist the plaintiffs in
suggesting alternative sites. If the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. had availed themselves
of scientific technology, they nlight have been able to convince the board to
locate the site in another suitable location. The alternative sites recommended
192. Id.
193. 706 F_ Supp at 884-85.
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by the plaintiffs in R.l.S.E:. were determined to be "environmentally unsuitable
because of the slope of the land and the existence of a stream running through
its center." 194
In the environmental discrin1ination area, the courts have made it clear that
the placement of an environmental hazard in a minority co1nmunity \vould be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiffs showed a disparate
impact and proved that the placernent decision was made with a discriminatory
intent. Thus, the earlier the plaintiffs get involved in the siting process the
better chance they will have to cornpile the significant amount of information
necessary to use as circumstantial evidence to build a winning Equal Protection
case.
IV. l'Hf". DEHATE OVER Tl-!E VALIDITY OF THE INTENT REQl,lREMhNT

After showing a disparate impact, in order to convince the court to apply
strict scrutiny 195 to a govcmrnental action, the plaintiff has to prove that the
action wa~ motivated by a desire to discri1nin<1te against the plaintiff because
of his race. 196 In the environmental discrimination context, this 1nean5 that the
plaintiff ha~ to prove that the governmental actor decided to allow the
environn1cntal hazard to be located in the plaintiff~s community because of the
race of the residents. Once the plaintiff meets his or her hurden of proof, the
hurden shifts to the governmental actor to justify the government's decision. 197
l'he first ~tep the governmental actor must take to survive strict 5crutiny is to
"articulate a legislative goal that is properly con~idered a compelling
·
" 198 Th en, th e govcm1nent must~ how th at th e tl cc1~1on
. . Jt
.
govem1nent interest.
made or action it took was narrowly drawn to achieve that compelling
.
199
governmcntaI interest.
Proponents have continued to ernhracc the justifications that the
Washington v. Davis Court used when advancing the discriminatory intent

194. R.l.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. l 144, 1J48{E.D. Ya. 1991).
195_ "To >urvivc 'otricl scrutiny. an ordinance n1u-;t be justified by compelling governmental
intcrc-.ts and e1nploy the least rcstricnvc means to effectuate those intere>ts" De1dil v City of
Milv:aukee, 176 F Supp. 2d 859, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
196. Johnson v. Ca!iforma, 336 F.3d J 117. l l \7-18 (9lh Cir. 2003).
197. See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v_ .\1inncsota Dcp'L of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir.
2003): John>on v . .\1ortbam. 915 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (\LD. Fla. 1996).
198_ Sherbrooke Turf 345 FJd at 969 (8tb Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Harre, 313 I·_
Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (D. Colo. 2004). rev"d, 324 f. Supp 2d 1171 (2004). ''Tbe question i> not
whether lhc govcrn1nent ha<; a compelling interest in generally enacting the la"" The inquiry
under e4ual protection is whether there is a con1pelling interest for the clo.ssijicut1on created by
the law." Barre, 313 r_ Supp 2d at 1090.
!9\l. MorthuJn, 915 f. Supp. at 1576; ;ee "/so Florida A.G.C_ Council, Inc. v. Florida, 303 r_
Supp. 2d 1307, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2004).
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20 u A
·
.
. t h e D av1s. case, one exp Ianation
.
rcqu1rerncnt.
ccord"ing to t h e J ustlces
1n
for requiring equal protection plaintiffs to prove di~cri1ninatory intent is the
need fur judicial cconumy. 201 The Court opined that, if the plaintiffs only had
to prove disproportionate impact, the level of govcrn1nenta! action that would
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny would incrcase. 202 As a consequence,
legitimate legislative decision-making would be adversely impacted and the
validity of governmental actions, including tax, welfare, public service,
203
regulatory, and licensing statutes would be in doubt.
In his article, Professor Charles R. Lawrence III puts forth several other
204
possible justifications for the Davis intent requirement.
One justification
Professor Lawrence states in his article can be characterized as judicial
fairness. He states that the Court determined that it would be unfair for the
judiciary co 1n1pose penalties on innocent persons in order to ren1edy harrns
that they did not intentionally cause. 205 In addition, Professor Lawrence
contends that the Davis Justices' adoption of the discriminatory intent
requirement rnay be defended on the basis of judicial consistency. 206 Making
the standard disproportionate impact, as oppo~ed to discriminatory intent,
would be inconsisten1 with traditional equal protection values because, in order
to resolve the issue, the judicial decision-maker would have to focus upon the
207
race of the plainciffs.
Finally, Lawrence seems to indicate that the Davis
Justices' decision to require discrirninatory intent may be explained on the
basis of judicial responsibi!ity. 208 It rnay be argued that it would be improper
for the courts to adver5ely impact legitimate social interests in an attempt to
remedy the racially disproportionate impact of facially neutral govemn1ent
actions. 209
1'he persons who disagree with the discriminatory intent requirement have
consistently stated several 1nain reasons for their opposition. One reason put
forth by those persons is that the discriminatory intent requirement places an
arduous and unfair burden of proof on the plaintiff. 210 ·rhe time and expense

200. Chari<:~ R. Lav..rence III, The Id, the Er:;o, and t:qual Protection: Reckoning with
UncOn.\Tious Roehm, 39 STA'.'/_ L RFV. 317, 320 (1987).
201 See id_ at 383.
202. Washington v. Davis, 426 LLS. 229, 242 (1976)
203. id_ al 248 (citing Frankl. Good111an, J)e Facto School Segregation. A Constitutional and
£01pirical Ana/yJis, 60 CALL. REV. 275, 300 (1972))_
204. La\vrence, supra note 200, at 320.
205. Id.
206. Id.
2()7_ hi.
208. Id. at 320---21.
209. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320- 21
210. See Mw,a Keenheel, The Need for !\'ew legislanon and Lihera/izat1or1 of Current Law.>
to Combat Env1ronmenl'1/ Racism, 20 TE\.lP. ENYTL L. & TECH. J. 105, 119 (2001) (~tat1ng thci.t

2006]

CHANG//'iG THF BA1HWATER AND KEEPING THE RABY

497

nece~sary to determine the motive of a governmental actor can be prohibitive,
especially since prospective plaintiffs are frequently low-income people and
minorities who often do not have the money to hire an attorney or expert
211
witnesses.
As a consequence, very few plaintiffs are able to get the courts to
recognize and resolve incidents of racial di~crimination. 212
'fhere are also practical things that make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
the information necessary to prove that the governmental actor has acted with a
discriminatory purpose. For example. the task of discovering the intent of the
governmental actor will be easier if there is a detailed record of the steps the
governmental actor took to reach the challenged deci~ion. The decision to
permit the placement of environmental hazards is usually 1nade at the local
level, and local governmental agencies often do not maintain detailed
records. 2 n
Therefore, there is not usually a "smoking gun" for the
214
environmental discrimination plaintiff to find.
Opponents also allege that the discri1ninatory intent constraint ignores
three important realities. First, since a person can unconsciously be 1notivated
by racism, the governmental actor may not be aware that his deci~ion 1s based
upon racist beliefs. 215 Specifically, Professor Lawrence argues that

[tjraditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial
rnatter~ arc influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as
neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcon1cs arc ~elf-con,ciously
sought~nor unintentional- -in the sen'c that the outcomes are rando1n,
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the dcci~ionrnakcr's beliefs, desires, and

wishc~. 216

"proving discrir111natory intent has been the albatross around the necks of rninonty plaintiffs
seeking relief from instances of environmental racism").
211. Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminalory P1<rpoo·e. Rethinking Equal
Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. l.. REV. 334, 344 (1986): M'e also (iod<,il, iupra note 75, al 410:
Le ..,hc Ann Colcrnan, lt"s the Thought Thilt Co1<n1f: The Intent Req1<iretr1en1 in Environmental
Racism C/aimr. 25 ST MARY'~ L. J. 447. 473-74 (1993).
212. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324; see al!,o Donna Gareis-Srnith, Environmental Raci.fm.
The Failure of F.qual Protection lo Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Patential of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TE\.fP. 1-.J\VIL. L & l"!·CH.J. 57, 67 (1994).
213. Edward Patrick Hoyle, Note, ft"s ,Vot Easy Bem' Green The P.rycho/ogy of Racism,
Environmental Dr.ll·nm1r1atiun, and !he Argiunent for J1odern1~1ng Equul Protection AnalyJ"il", 46
VAND. L. RloV. 937, 964-65 (1993).
2!4 /d.m965
215. See Ian F. Haney Lope?, fn,-titutionlll Raci:im. Judicial Conduct and a f\'cw Theory of
Racial Discrimination, I 09 YALI' L.J 1717, ! 806 (2000); .1ee also Linda Hainilton Krieger. The
Content of Our Categoriei. A Cogr1111ve Rirl.\ Approach to D1scrimint.1t1on and Equal lcn1ploy1nen1
Opportunity, 47 S"lAJ\. L REV. 1!61,1186 (1995).
216. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322; see also Miriarn Knn, Note and Coinmcnt,
Di1crim1nat1on in the Wen Ho Lee Case. Rein1erpre11ng the Intent Requirernent in Conllit1<tion"l
and Statutory Rt.ice Discrimination Cases, 9 A~IA'\ L.J. 117, 139 (2002).
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Secondly, since most govemmentai decisions are rnade by a group and not
by individuals, the governmental action results from the interaction of multiple
motives. 217 Thus, it is a!Jnost i1npossihle to attribute di~criminatory intent to a
group of people. 218 As a result, each individual decision-maker will be able to
219
argue that his action was based upon racially neutral considerations.
Thirdly, in this day of political correctness, governmental decision-1nakers will
be sure to hide any improper motives that may have contributed to their
actions. 220 Moreover, opponents of the discriminatory intent requirement
argue that the negative impact of unequal treatment is felt by the affected
co1nmunity regardless of whether that negative impact was caused by
221
intentional or unintentional discrimination.

217. See Palmer v. Thompson, 40J U.S. 2 I 7, 224-25 (1971). Jusllce Alack slated;
First, il 1s eJ1tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the rnot1vation, or collection of
different moti~alion>, that lie behind a legislati~e enactn1cnt.
It ;, difficult or
unpossible for any court to detennine the "sole" or "do1ninant" motivation hehind the
choice~ of a group of legislators. Furthennore, there is an element of futility in a judicial
attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law i>
>!ruck down for this reason, rather than becau~e of 1L~ facial content or effect, it would
pre~urnably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing hody rcpasscd it for
different reasons.
Id.

218 s,,e BULLARD, 111.pra note 13, at 15 (''In~ti1utional racism continues to affect policy
decisions related to the enforcement or env!fonmenlal regulation>."); .1ee also Rebecca Hanner
White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Maner:i?. Discrimination in .Wu/ti-Actor
Emp/oy1nen1 De('ision Making, 61 LA. L Rr.v. 495, 530 (2001); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh
Bhag.... al, The McC/e:,·ky Puule: Rnnedying Pro:,·ecu.toria/ f)iscriminalion Against 13/ack Victims
in Cilpital Sentenc:mg, 1<J98 SUP. C·1 REV. 145, 154-55 ( 1998); David A Strauss, Di.1criminatory
Intent and the Ta1ning a/Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956---58 (1989) (addressing The futility
of inquiring if a group consciously decided lo engage in 1ntent1onal discriffilnation).
219 See Ea>! Bibb Twiggs .\/eighborhood Ass'n v. J\.1acon-B1bb County Planning & :t-0ning
Corrnn·n, 706 I-'. Supp. 880, 88J n 4 (M.D. Ga. 1989). According to the coun, on the record,
three corrun1ssioncrs stated a neutral reason for voting in favor of or against the approval of !he
landfill project. Id Co1nmis>ioner Pippinger contended that he voted to approve !he application
after he reviewed "ail of tbe details[,] the use of the land and the facts and conclusions
" Id.
lo voting againsl the proJCCt. Corrunissioner Ingrarn stated that the proposed project did not
satP.fy the need for a con1prchensive waste n1anagen1ent plan. Co1nrni>>ion Ingram a[,,o ohjecrcd
to recon.1idcnng the application after it had already been denied. Id. Commissioner Cullinan
voted lo grant the landfill permit and stated: "We can't rule on '>ites until they are brought to use.
This site was brought to llS .... If others arc brought to us in North Macon, South Macon. West
Macon, we have to be as deliberative and as thoughtful and 1nake an independent as.1ess1ncnt
there to see whether in fact the land u~e is adequate." Id.
220. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 319.
22 J. Id.
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A Few of the Proposed Alternatives to the Intent Requirement

Since most discrimination is not blatant and decision-makers usually do
not leave a paper trail showing discri1ninatory motive, it will continue to be
difficult for environmental discrimination plaintiffs to meet the intent
threshold.
In addition, at the time the Court established conscious
discriminatory intent as the standard equal protection plaintiffs had to meet, in
many parts of the country overt racism was commonplace. 222 However, over
the la~t few decades, society has indicated that overt racism will not be
tolcratcd. 223 Thus, in this day of political correctness, 224 the incidences of
overt racism by persons in the public eye are immediately condemned. 225
Today, most of the raci~m in the country is covert. 226 Hence, the plaintiffs in
equal protection cases have an almost insurmountable task when it comes to
proving blatant intent to discriminate on the part of the governmental actor. 227
Even if environmental discrimination plaintiffs are able to put together a
forceful ca~e, the chance~ of winning arc slim because circumstantial evidence
is capable of being interpreted in so many different ways. As a result, the
environmental discrirnination plaintiff is forced to ~uffer tremendou~ hann on a
. 228
d a1·1 y bas1s.
Regardless of the decision-maker's intent, minorities feel the impact of
discriminatory environmental practices. It is of no help or solace to the
229
communities whose children are poisoned by lead,
or to familie~
222 5;,,,, Deana A_ Pollard, Uncon1ciou1 Bia1 and Self-Cntical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified l>'wdentiary l:'qual Employme111 Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913. 928
(1999); see also Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-coding'" Colorblind Slurs During the
Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates. 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611. 617- J 8 (2000).
223. See Ruger I. Abran!S, Off His Rocker: Spons Discipline and Wbor Arbitration. 11
MARQ. SPORTS L_ REV_ 167, 171 (2001)_ In evaluating the harshnes5 of John Rocker's
punish1ncnt for making racist statements in a magazine interview, the author notes ··Rocker's wm;
the harshest player discipline for off-work hchavior unconnected to mi ~conduct such as suhstancc
abu~e an<l gambling.... Ty Cobb wa~ a notoriuu~ raci~t <luring a lime when the country accepted
~uch sentunenb as natun!l an<l apprupnate." Id.
224. See Charles R. Calleros. Reconciliu1ion of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After R.A. V.
v_ City of St. Paul. Free Speech, Antihurras~ment Pohcies. Multicultural Fducation, and Po/1t1cfll
Cnrrectne.u at Arizona State lln1versi1y, 1992 UTAH L REV_ 1205. 1263---64 ( l 992)_
225. See Ross])_ Petty ct aL, Regulat1r1g Target il4arketing flnd Other Race-Bused Advert1.1Jng
Practices. 8 MIC!!. J. RACE & L. 335. 337-338 (2003) (discus~1ng the treatment uf Trent Loll
after his rernarks at Strom Thum1an"s birthday party).
226. Jill E. E;ans. Challenging the Racism in Environn1ental Racism: Redefining the Concept
of Intent, 40 ARJ:t_ I _REV. 1219. 1275 ( l 99S)_
227. Id_
22S. See Ncl~on, supra note 211, at 344.
229. See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Ww.1 on Lead-Based Paint: Fro1n Code
Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 5 l l, 516 (1994 ). ''A <li.,proport1onalely high
number of ethnic rninurity children live in poverty. in dilap1daced housing. and are poisoned by
lead paint" frf_ (citing KARie:-. L. FLDl<IJ\l Lr AL, ENv·n._ DhHc:-.Sh Ft;:-.n, LFG>\CY OF LEAD:
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experiencing various illnesses as a result of exposure to toxic emissions, that
the polluter did not overtly single out minorities to be almost the exclusive
recipients of the pollution. 230 Moreover, the discriminatory intent requirement
ignores the fact that racist decisions may be motivated by overt racism or the
unconscious racist attitudes of the decision-maker. Numerous commentators
have argued that proof of discriminatory intent dooms many equal protection
cases because unconscious racism, on an individual and an institutional level,
is widespread in our society. 231
The criticism of the intent requirement has led to numerous suggestions for
replacement standards.
Some commentators have argued that the
discriminatory intent requirement should be totally abandoned when legislative
232
Others, who
actions have a substantial disparate impact on a suspect class.
disagree with the intent requirement, appear to oppose the standard of proof the
plaintiffs have to meet to be successful. Thus, they have proposed alternatives
that focus upon the type of information the plaintiffs should have to submit to
prove discriminatory intent. 233 This section offers a brief summary of a few of
the suggested proposals.

AMERICA'S CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, Appendix ! , Table A- l ).
"In 1988, in metropolitan areas of more than one million, approximately 68% of black children
and 36o/o of white children in households earning under $6,000 have blood lead levels in excess
of fifteen milligrams per deciliter, in households with incomes between $6.000 and $14,999, the
estimates arc 54% of black children and 23% of white children." Schukoske. supra. at 516-17
n.30.
230. According to a study released by the Citizens· Environmental Coalition. an advocacy
group located in New York, minority neighborhoods are more likely than white neighborhoods to
be the location of environmental hazards, including incinerators and bus depots. Paul H.B. Shin,
A Cloud ()i.·er Minority Nobes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at 28.
231. E.g., Valerie P. Mahoney, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories To Complete
Solutions, 21 CAROOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1999); see also Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a
More Realistic Standard far Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
19, 41 (2002) (analyzing Charles Lawrence's notion that unconscious racism is "just as
pernicious an evil as deliberate discrimination, and . . has no place in governmental action");
Colopy, supra note 33, at 151-52 (illustrating that a required showing of intent for redress in
cases of institutional mcisn1 ..legitimizes the presumption that conscious racism is blameworthy
but unconscious racism is not"); Boyle, supra note 213, at 938 (discussing how racist attitudes
can unconsciously influence decisional actions and infonnational processing, contributing to the
incomplete understanding of racial discrimination).
232. See Boyle, supra note 213. at 980-81 {proposing the replacement of the intent
requirement with an intenncdiate test in which plaintiffs would have co show that the actions of
the government caused significant disparate impact on a suspect class).
233. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355-58 (proposing that plaintiff submit data on
"cultural meaning .. of a racially discriminatory act).
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1.

Abandonment of the Intent Requirement (Throwing Out the Baby)

a.

lntcr1nediatc Scrutiny Theory

501

Commentator Ed\.vard P. Boyle proposes that courts abandon the intent
standard and apply an intennediatc level of scrutiny to all legislative decisions
that have a substantial disparate impact on suspect classes. 2 _i 4 In evaluating its
decision, courts would ask whether the structure of the decision-making
process was likely to generate a disparate racial outcome. 2:i.'i Under an
intermediate-level scrutiny approach, the plaintiffs would first have to show
that the govcrn1nental act had a significant disparate impact upon the suspect
class of which they \Vere members. 236 The class members would 1neet that
burden by sho\ving that an extraordinarily large number or percentage of class
n1emhers were disadvantaged by the decision-makers' actions. 237 If the class
memhers did not meet their burden on the disparate impact issue, the decision~
n1akers would prevail. 238 In the event that the class members were able to
sustain their burden of proof, the decision-makers could still defeat the class
rne1nbers' claim by proving that a significant number or percentage of the
persons si1nilarly impacted were not members of a su:-:.pcct cla,.s. If the court
found the evidence of impact to be inconclusive, it would look at similar past
actions by the decision-maker,. to detennine if any of tho5e prior decisions had
239
a disparate racial impact.
If the class members succes,.fully demonstrated that only the 1nembcrs of
their class suffered the disparate impact, the deci,.ion-makcrs would bear the
burden of proving that the clao.s members' interests \.Vere represented
adequately in the decision-making process. 240 The decision-makers could
satisfy their burden by o.howing that the class representatives were p<ut of the
decision-making procc,.s and that tho5e representatives were fully informed of
241
the threat the dcci~ion posed to the cla~s mernbers.
Subsequently, the
burden would shift to the class members to prove that their interests were
242
inadequately represented or that the decision-making proce~s was dcfcctivc.
In evaluating the adequacy of reprc,.entation, the court would cono.idcr the
following factors: (1) the number of suspect class rcprcsentative.5 \.vho were
actually decision-makers or otherwise substantially involved in the decision
making process: (2) the process by which the representatives were chosen; (3)
234.
235.
236.
23 7.
238.
239.
240.
241
242.

See Boyle, .\·upra note 21lat98(}-81.
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id. at 980--81.
Id. at 981.
Boyle. supra note 213, a! 981
lri.
Id.
Id.
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the level of communication between the impacted parties and their
representatives; (4) the quality of information made available to those

impacted and their representatives; (5) the amount of consideration that the
decision-makers gave to less intrusive options; and (6) the incentives of the
representatives, if any, that might have run counter to the interests of the
243
impacted group.
The court's finding on the representation would detennine the level of
scrutiny the court would apply to the challenged decision.2 44 If the court
concluded that the interests of the impacted group were adequately represented
and not hampered by deficiencies in the decision-making process, the decision
makers would only have to show that they had a rational basis for making their
245
decision.
Conversely, if the court found that suspect class representatives
did not adequately participate in the decision-making process, it would
carefully examine the decision to detennine if the decision-makers had given
adequate consideration to the interests of those impacted. 246 The court would
weigh the severity of the disparate impact on the class members against the
extent of the inadequate representation and nature of the governmental interest
247
at stake.
Since, in most cases, the class members would lack access to
evidence regarding the decision-making process, the court would presume that
the decision-makers' decision was discriminatory because of the inadequate
representation. 248 The decision-makers could rebut this presumption by
presenting evidence that they considered the impacted group's interests despite
the inadequacy of representation or that the decision was supported by a
compelling government interest. 249 In order for the class members to support
their case, they would submit evidence of discrimination in the decision
making process along with a history of the decision-makers' actual
discrimination. 250 Under this test, the court's focus would be on whether the
decision-making process sufficiently protected the concerns of the impacted
class members. 251
The value of this proposed test is that it would require courts to do a
thorough evaluation of the decision-making process instead of just focusing on
the individual placement decision. 252 This probing would benefit the plaintiff
and the public. The plaintiff would benefit because a critical analysis of the

243. Id. at 98!--&2.
244. Boyle, supra note 213, al 982.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Boyle, supra note 213, at 982.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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decision-making proce.<.s is more likely to reveal evidence of racial bias on the
part of the decision-maker. In addition, if persons making environmental siting
decisions knew that the process, as well as the decision, was subject to judicial
scrutiny, they would probably take precautions to ensure the fairness of the
process.
In the environmental context, this would mean that the decision-makers
would take steps to ensure that members of the impacted community are
represented in the decision-making process. 253 Under the current system,
decision-makers often choose to approve the placement of environmental
hazards in the communities where they arc likely to encounter the least amount
of resistance. If the interests of persons in minority communities are fully
represented in the process, decision-rnakers may be hesitant to repeatedly place
environmental hazards in their communitie.<..
Application of Boyle's proposed test would benefit the public because it
would force the decision-makers to make more informed placement choices
and to fully consider the consequences of their actions. Further, if the
decision-making process does not have the appearance of impropriety, there
may be a decline in the number of lawsuits filed against the governmental
entity. Thus, the resources spent defending lawsuits may be available to fund
projects that benefit the community.
The main weakness of this proposed test is that it recommends that the
court apply a standard that is less than strict scrutiny to cases involving
allegations of racial discriinination. 254 In those types of cases, the government
should always have to satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement. 255 Additionally,
Boyle's theory may be just as burdenson1e on the environmental discrimination
plaintiff as the current intent requirement. In order to meet his or her
evidcntiary burden under Boyle's test, the plaintiff would have to submit a
large amount of detailed information to the court. If the plaintiff has access to
that kind of information, he or she would probably be able to satisfy the
discriminatory intent requirement as it i5 currently applied.
The problem minorities face is the cumulative impact of the placement of
several environmental hazards in their co1nmunities. ·rherefore, any legal tool
that permits court5 to evaluate the decision-making process instead of the
isolated placement decision will be beneficial to persons fighting
environmental discrimination. On balance, implementation of Boyle's test

253. See id. al 984-87 (analyling two examples of possible inadequate representation of a
suspect class under the intennediate scrutiny theory).
254. See Hoyle, ~upro. note 2ll at 981-82 (propo>ing that rhe court apply a rational hasis or
intcnncdiatc scrutiny standard when evaluating a case depending on the facts).
255. See John~on v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410. 2419 (2005) (discussing the importance of
applying strict scrutiny in case~ involving govemment-unposed racial clas~1fications).
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\vould provide niore benefit~ than burJens tu Lhc persons conihating
environmental di~crimination.
b.

Environmental Tort Theory

Professor Kathy Seward Northern propose,. creating a new tort to deal with
environmental discrimination issues. 2-' 0 The tort would be the "intent to cause
. II y d.1sproport1onate
.
.
I b ur dens. " 257
U nder
racta
exposure to env1ronmcnta
Professor Northem's theory, an owner or operator of an environmental hazard
would he subject to liability if his intentional conduct imposed a ·'racially
disproportionate environmental burden." 2-' 8 The owner or operator would be
liable for "resulting bodily harm, mental distress, or property damage." 259 The
plaintiff would have to prove that the owner or operator intended to impo,.e the
racially disproportionate environmental burden. 260
Professor J\1orthern propo~es using a different definition of intent thllil the
261
one that is currently required in equal protection cases.
The proposed
202
replacement definition of intent would be based upon tort law principles.
Thus, in the context of this new tort, intent would include a purpose or desire
to bring about a given consequence llild a subst<mtial certainty that such a
consequence would occur. 201 Courts would apply a reasonable person standard
in evaluating whether the defendant had the necessary intent. 204 Therefore, if a
reasonable person in the actor's position believed that his action was
substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive contact, the defendant
would be lreatcd as though he had inlendcd thal result. 265
()ne purpose of Professor Nortbem's proposed tort is to encourage owners
and operators of facilities currently located in minority co1nmunitic5 to con1ply
fully with environ1nental regulation5. 266 A second purpose is to discourage
owners and operators of environmental hazards from concentrating such
hazards 1n minority cornmunities and from placing the hazards in
geographically or geologically unsuitable areas. 267
If Professor '.\Jorthem's proposal is adopted, it will provide more option~
for person~ co1nbating environmental discri1nination. The environmentally

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261
262_
26J.
264.
265.
266.
267_

Northem supra note 15, al 577-78.
Id. at 578
Id.

Id.
See id.
Northern, 'uprr1 note 15, at 583.
Id_
Id_

See id. at 574.
Id.
Northem. i-upro note !S, at 578-79_
Id.
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discriminated-against plaintiff will benefit from the application of tort law
because tort law has a more expansive definition of intent. In tort law there is
a presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his action. 268 Therefore, intent is attributed to a person if he or she acted with
purpose or design or with substantial certainty that the result would occur. 269
Expansion of the definition of intent will enable courts to consider unconscious
racism. As a consequence, decision-makers will give more consideration to
the impact their decisions may have on minority communities. 270
Another positive aspect of Professor Northern's theory is that it would
place the financial burden on the entities that are directly responsible for the
disproportionate placement of the environmental hazard. The owner or
operator of the facility causing the harm should have to compensate the
plaintiffs. Owners and operators are in the best position to make sure that a
facility is as environment-friendly as possible. Those persons are also the ones
with the most information about the impact an environmental hazard will have
on members of the community.
One of the drawbacks of relying on tort law to remedy the disproportionate
placement of environmental hazards in minority communities is that the
plaintiffs will be deprived of the protections that minority persons receive in
constitutional cases. Thus, the standard that decision-makers will have to meet
to justify their actions will be less stringent. In addition, the remedies available
under tort law may be limited. The primary remedy available under tort law is
usually damages. 271 In environmental cases, the plaintiffs may not suffer
damages until several years after they have been exposed to the hazards. At
that time, the statute of limitations may prevent the plaintiffs from bringing a
cause of action. 272 Moreover, the plaintiffs' initial injuries may be minor.

268. Cheek v. Hamlin, 277 N.E.2d 620, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
269. "Substantial certainty" has been described as more than "mere knowledge and
appreciation of a risk." Pariseau v. Wedge Prods., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ohio 1988)
(quoting W, PAGE KEETOJ\, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E, KEETON & DAVID G. 0\\'El\, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984)).
270. The possibility of tort liability may serve as a deterrent to decision-makers who are
inclined to place environmental hazards in minority communities chat arc already heavily
polluted. See Northern, supra note 15, at 578-79.
271. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL, TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROHLE\iS 607 (3d ed.
2002).
272, ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARl'ES. BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND
PROBLEM5 344 (2003). "A stallJte of limitations relates 10 the lime a plaintiff should reasonah\y
have known that he or she had a legal claim and bars a claim unless it is filed within a certain
penod after that time.'" Id.; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATER!ALS ON
THELAWOFTORTS775(3ded. 1997).
In many jurisdictions, the typical two-year ton statute of limitations is a clock chat starts
running on the date of "injury" or "'occurrence." If "occurrence" could be understood to
mean the date of exposure, or if '"injury" could be interpreted as the first time when the
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However, after the case has been litigated and resolved, the plaintiff may suffer
further damages. The plaintiffs may be barred from seeking damages from an
273
Given
injury that occurred as a result of the previously litigated incident.
the changes that have occurred because of tort reform, the use of tort law may
be a limited solution to the problem of the inequitable placement of
environmental hazards. 274
Nonetheless, implementation of the proposed environmental tort would
give the minority community another weapon to fight the disproportionate
placement of environmental hazards in their neighborhoods. Given the lack of
success plaintiffs have had utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, the
availability of a tort cause of action would be a welcomed addition to the legal
landscape.
2.

Modification of the Intent Requirement (Changing the Bathwater)

a.

Cultural Meaning Theory

275

According to Professor Charles Lawrence, unconscious racism results
because "Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that
attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and
opinions about nonwhites." 276 Professor Lawrence proposes replacing the
discriminatory intent requirement with a cultural meaning test that focuses
upon unconscious racism. 277 In applying the test, courts would look to see if

to~ic substance begins to have any physiological effects, then the plaintiff might find that
the clock has run out by the time she actually contracts the disease.

Id.

273. See CHRISTIE ET AL, supra note 272, at 775 ("Under traditional tort rules, a plaintiff
may not 'split' her claim and later seek future damages in a different suit. Rather, she must bring
her suil within the statute of limitations, and then seek in that suit all damages flowing from 1ha1
injury:').
274. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victim~ of Ton Refonn: Women, Children,
and rhe Elderly, 53 EMORY LJ, 1263 (2004) (discussing the damage caps es1ablished under new
tort reform measures). See also CHRISTIE ET AL, supra note 272, at 904-17.
275. In his !994 article, Marco "'1asoni, then a student at Georgetown University Law Center,
applied the cultural meaning test to an environmental discrimination case. As the result of his
analysis, Masoni concluded that "[t]he cultural meaning test forces one to lake a hard look at a
case and, if necessary, probe beneath the apparent neutrality of decisions which
disproportionately impact minorities." Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 113 (1994).
276. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322.
277. id. at 355--62.
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the governmental action conveyed a symbolic message to which the culture
attaches racial significance. 278
As a part of that analysis, the court would consider evidence regarding the
historical and social context in which the decision was made and
implemented. 279
If, based upon that review, the court decides by a
preponderance of the evidence that a significant portion of the population
would think of the governmental action in racial terms, the court would
presume that "socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the
action's meaning had influenced the decisionmakers." 280 As a consequence,
the court would infer discriminatory intent and apply heightened scrutiny. 281
To illustrate his theory, Profes~or Lawrence gave the example of a
government decision to construct a wall between white and black
communities. 282 According to Profe..,sor Lawrence, the construction of the
wall would have a "cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites'
need to separate themselves from blacks as a symbol of their superiority." 283
Since the construction of the wall would conjure up racial inferiority, it would
burden blacks living in the affected communities and reinforce a system of
racial discrimination. 284 Therefore, the blacks in those communities should not
have to prove discriminatory intent in order to get judicial redress because the
court should assume that the decision to construct the wall wa.., based upon
race. 285
This test could provide some salvation for persons trying to combat
environmental discrimination. In order to get around the discriminatory intent
requirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that the deci~ion to place the
environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood had a cultural meaning that
was based upon the race of the persons living in the impacted area. The
placement of an environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood could have
a cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites' beliefs that
minority neighborhoods are not fit for anything other than dumping. 286 In
addition. the placement of environmental hazards in a predominately minority

278. Id. at 356.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281 Lawrence. ~upra note 200, at 356.
282. Id. at 357.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 358.
285. See id. al 356-58.
286. See BULLARD, ;·upra note 13, m 5 (discussing the fad that toxic durnps and other local!y
unwanted land u-;c<; (LULU~) have hi:,torically hccn placed in minonty and lo...,,·-1nco111e
communilie>).
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neighborhood may further promote the opinion that minorities arc "second
287
class" citizens who do not deserve to live in clean, safe neighborhoods.
The cultural meaning test may impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff. In
some situations, that burden rnay be just as arduous as the one environmental
discrimination plaintiffs currently face when trying to prove discri1ninatory
intent. The burden of proof will be difficult to meet because the cultural
meaning test employs a subjective standard. 288 A person's background and life
experiences will impact the meaning that he or she gives to a particular action.
In the environmental arena. the negative cultural meaning that is attached to a
placement decision will not be as apparent as in segregation cases. Therefore,
in order to prove the cultural n1eaning attached to a particular placement
decision, the plaintiff would have to acquire the services of an expert such as a
cultural anthropologist. Low-income persons and n1inorities usually do not
have the financial resources to hire expert witnesses. In addition, since cultural
anthropology is not an exact science, the case may be con1plicated by a battle
of expert witnesses. Another concern is that the cultural meaning test may be
considered vague and speculative because it does not state the objective
parameters that are necessary to prove cultural meaning.
Ulti1nately, the cultural meaning test is preferable to the current method of
deterrnining intent in environmental discrimination cases. Application of the
cultural meaning test will allow the court to expose unconscious racisn1. crhc
cultural meaning test may also be used as a tool for educating decision-maker~
about unconscious racism. Most decision-makers may be unaware that their
underlying biases are inf1uencing the choices they make in their official
capacities. Acknowledgn1ent of the cultural 1neaning pheno1ncnon 1nay lead
decision-makers to take steps to make the process more inclusive. Initially, it
1nay be difficult to attach cultural meaning to government actions, however,
after a few cases, the necessary data will be available for use by future
plaintiffs.
b.

Reversing the Groups 'fheory

Professor David Strauss proposes what he calls a "reversing the groups"
test. 289 The test would be used to define what discrin1inatory intent means.
Under the test, courts would ask the following question: Would the
government actor have made the same decision if he had known that the
challenged governmental action would have adversely impacted whites instead

287. SPe id. (citing Robert Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and 1he
Polilics of lc"quity: Fn1er,;ent Trend.1 in lhP Black Community, 12 MID-Al\1. REV. Of' SOC 21, 28
(1987), and emphasi7ing that the disdain for rninunt1cs led lo the ·'Place in Blacks' Back Yard'"
(PIBBY) pnnciple).
288 See Lawrence, ;;upra note 200. at 355-56.
289. Strauss, supra note 218, at 956-59.
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of blacks?290 Another way to put the question is: Would the government have
made a decision that negatively affected the plaintiffs if they were members of
a different race? If the answer to the question is no, the court should decide
that the decision was made with discriminatory intent. 291
If this test is applied to an environmental discrimination case, courts would
ask: Would the government actor have decided to place the environmental
hazard in the community if the population of the community was
predotninately white? In order to meet his or her burden of proof under this
test, the environmental discrimination plaintiff would have tu ~how that the
decision-maker chose to place the hazard in a 1ninurity neighborhood even
though there was a non-minority neighborhood suitable for the project.
Application of this test would have been helpful to the plaintiffs in the East
Bibb case because they had evidence that the county had previou!>ly refused to
site the landfill in a predominately white neighborhood. 292 The shortcoming of
the proposed test is the fact that the court may not be able to determine the true
answer to the question becau~e the government actors can always come up
with a non-discriminatory reason for environmental placement decisions.
Like under the current intent requirement, the "reversing the groups" test
will place the plaintiff in the difficult position of attempting to attribute a
single motive to a group of people. Nonetheless. the "reversing the groups"
theory will force decision-makers to at least consider non-minority areas when
they are making placement decisions. Having to answer the question posed by
this theory in court may be an incentive for decision-makers to consider factors
other than race when selecting locations for environmental hazards.

3.

My Fair Share Theory

The cement that holds our society together is the belief that the foundation
of our society is justice. 29·1 True justice cannot be achieved if burden~ are
294
I
placed on a few persons in order to benefit the majority of the population.
arrived at my theory by relying on the readings of John Rawls. In A lheory of

290. Id. at 956-57.
291 Id. at 957_
292_ East Hihh Twiggs r-.·e1ghborhood Ass'n v. :vlai.:on-Bibb County Planning
Cu1nrn'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M_D_ Ga_ 1989).

& Zoning

293. In A Theory of Justice, John Rai,vls slates, "[A] society is well-ordered when it is not only
designed to advance the good of it~ 1nembers but when it is also cffectivdy regulated by a pub he
conception of JUStice." JOHN RAWLS, A TH!·.ORY OF JL;STICE 4 (rev. ed., The Belknap Preso; of
Harvard Univcro;ity Press 1999) (1971).
294_ Id. at 3.
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Justice, John Rawls characterizes justice as faimess.
Hence, a society
296
cannot be just without a concept of fairness.
According to Rawls:
297
[A] person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair). that is, it
298
satisfies the two principles of JUS!iee;
and second. one has voluntarily
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the
299
opportunities
···re
11 o ers to rh
urt er one ··
s interests.

Rawls explains that, in a situation where a group of persons are
cooperating to achieve a goal, all of the persons should make sacrifices,
including restricting their liberties, to benefit the group as a whole. In that
circumstance, the members of the group will be equally burdened and equally
benefited.~ 00 Rawls concludes, "We are not to gain from the cooperative
labors of others without doing our fair share." 301 In the land use context, the
concept of fair share developed as a potential solution to exclusionary
d·h
l ustonary
. .
zoning. ' ° ' nI d
a ress1ng
t e ·issue ofexc
zoning, one court
determined that each community has an obligation to take its "fair share" of
low-income persons:103 In the environmental law context, each comJnunity has
the responsibility to take its fair share of the environmental hazards located in
the area. 3i:»

295. Id. at 10.
296. Id. at 11 Rawls states that the theory of '·'jus!Jce as faimes.1' . . convey;, the nlea that
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that i;, fair." Id.
297. Rawb refers to an institution a;, "a public system of rules which define; offices and
positions with theIf rights and duties. powers and innnunitics, and the like." id. at 4 7.
298. The rwo principles of iustice for institutions arc the following:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each per1on is 10 have an equal nght to the most exten;ive total ;ys1em of equal ba;ic
liberties compatihle with a sinnlar .-.y"1cn1 of liberty for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Social and economic inequalities are lo be arranged so that they arc both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the leas! advantaged, consistent with the just savings
pnnciple, and
(h) attached 10 office; and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.
RAWLS, supra note 293, al 266.
299. Id. at 96.
300. Id. (citing H.L A Hart, Are There Any Natur,,/ Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. I 85f ( 1955)).
301. Id. at 96.
302. "Exclu~ionary zoning" refer.-. to the practice of closing an entire community to unwanted
group.1 such as low-income and rn1nonty persons. Richard lliompson Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Po/iricai (;eogrophy in legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1870 ( 1994).
303. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (N.J.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
304. When discussing ··rair treatment,"' the Environmental Protection Agency states that "no
group of people, including raciaL ethnic. or soc1~conomic group 5hould bear a di~proportionatc
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Because it is the antithesis of fairness, discrimination is a tennite that eats
at the foundation of society. Therefore, in order for our society to remain
intact, all forms of discrimination 1nust be exterminated. The Equal Protection
Clause was enacted to eliminate discrimination by not allowing similarly
situated persons to be treated differently. 305 Consequently, the quest for justice
should be the desire of all courts, especially when reviewing an allegation of
discrimination.
In the United States, it is clear that environmental hazards are not
distributed equally. 306 Under the current system, the facilities needed to
provide services for the entire community are usually placed in areas
containing populations that are mostly low-income and minority.:io 7 Thus,
low-income and minority persons bear the burden of environmental pollution
while the majority of the population receives the benefits provided by the
pollution producing facilitics. 3n8 Despite recognition of the fact that low
1ncome and minority persons are disproportionately impacted by
environmental pollution, persons seeking a remedy 1n an environmental
discrimination case have to overcome a big hurdle-proving discriminatory
intent. 309 They must prove that the government actors who made the decision
to place the environmental hazard in their community were motivated by
. . .
.
310
d 1scnm1natory intent.

<;hare of the negali~c environn1ental consequences resulting from indu<,lnal. municipal, and
comn1ercial operations or the execution uf federal, state, local, and tnbal programs and policies."'
Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatnli'nt of f."nvironmenla/ Justice Claim;_ Plo.intiffs Face a
Oead End in the Courtroo"1, 12 B.U. PL'B_ II\T. L.J. 223, 223 (2002) (quoting EPA, INTERIM
FINAL GUIDAl'C!-. FOR l'.\'CORPORATING ENVIROJ\"\.1!-.I\"IAL Jus·11C1: CON("!-RNS IN El'A's NEPA
CUMPLIA"l("E Al\Al.YS!S 2 ( 1997))_
305. See Green v_ City of Tucson. 340 F.3d 89l. 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Clehumc
v_ Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 ( 1985)).
306. See Moh~u & Rryanl. supra note 27, at 921-22_
307 For example, in New York Stale, '·communities with a minority population of at leas! 70
percent have ahouc 18 percent of the state's air pollution site~ hut only make up ahout .5 percent
of the land area."' Danita Chambers, Pollution High Where fncome ls Low, TIMES UNIOK, :\1.ar_
12, 2004, at 83; :,·ee also Jay Rey, Watchdog Group Accu.~e.~ State of £nvironn1ental Ro.cism, THL
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at B22 (discussing the fact that in New York State, 1nembers of
"minority communitic<; are expo~cd tu a disproportionate anmunt of air pollution ..").
308. See Harvey L_ White, Race, C/a:,s, and Environmel!to.l Hazards, in ENVIR0'.\''\.1EN rAL
]'.\'JCSTICES, POLITICAL STRlJGGLl::S 65, 67 (David E. Camacho ed., 1998) (stating that "1n
Detroit, a person of color'; chance of Jiving i,11ithin a mik of a hazardous wa;Ce facility is four
tnnes greater than a white American's").
309. See R.I.S.E., Inc_ v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (EJ)_ Va. 1991); :,ee also Luke W.
Cole & Shelia R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIROJ\'MENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE Or
THE [NV1R0!\'\.1LVI ALJCSTICE MOVEJ\-11-'N"I 64 (2001).
310. Ea<,t Bihh Ti,>1igg'> 1'eighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning
Connn'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
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The di~criminatory intent requirement is such a high standard that it flies in
lhe face of fairness and prevents plaintiffs in environmental discrimination
cases from receiving _justice. Nonethcle~s, I am not proposing that the
discriminatory intent requirement be replaced with a different standard. A
legal standard should not be thrown out simply because it is applied in a
manner that disadvantages one side. I am proposing that the courts change the
manner in which they evaluate whether or not the plaintiff has proven
discriminatory intent.
A disparate impact standard would tilt the table too heavily in favor of the
plaintiffs in environ1nental discrimination cases. It is usually pretty easy to
prove disparate impact because it is well documented that minorities are
disproportionately impacted by environmental hatards. 311 Disparate impact
usually becomes a problem when the community feels the cumulative impact
of several environmental hazards. 1'hus, application of a disparate impact
standard would require current decision-makers to be held accountable for the
.
. pred ecessors. ••
actions
o f the1r
Current decision-maker~ should not be held responsible for past decisions
to place environmental hazards unless they acted with knowledge that their
placement decision would make the situation worse. A person should only be
held liable if there is some level of culpability on his or her part. In order to be
held liable under the Equal Protection Clause, the persons who 1nade the
challenged decision should have some actual knowledge or attributable
knowledge of the harm their action would cause to persons living in the
impacted neighborhood.
On the other hand, strict application of the
discrin1inatory intent standard places an onerous burden on the environmental
discrimination plaiotiff and advantages the decision-makcr. 313
The intent standard should be maintained to avoid holding persons liable
for harms they did not intend to cause. Nonetheless, intent should be defined
broadly enough to encompass both conscious and unconscious racisin. 314 The
underlying basis of my proposal is faimess 315 and social cooperation. 316
311. See Centner el al., supra note 32, at 127-28.
312. Lawrence, :,·upra note 200, at 320.
313. See '\ilitchell A. Horv.·ich, Coinment, Title VI aj the 1964 Civil Right:,· Act and the
C/u:,ing ofa Public Hv;pital, 1981 !JUKE L.J. 1033. I 043-45 (1981 ).
314. Lawrence. supra note 200, at 324-25.
315. See RA \VLS. supra note 293, at 301--08 (discussing why fairness is of great imponance in
aJUSt <,OCJety).
316. See John Rawb. The Basic Liben1es and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND
LAW 2. 14 (Sterling M. McMurrined.. 1987).
The notion of social cooperation is not sirnply thal of coordinated social activity
efficiently organized and guided hy publicly recognized rules to achieve some overall
end. Social cooperation i~ always for mutual benefit and this implies that it involve~ two
elements: the first i~ a shared notion of fair tenns of cooperation. which each panicipanl
rnay reasonably be expected lo ac1.:ept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts Chern.
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Fairness should play a part in any equal protection analysis because the
amendment was enacted to address the issue ofinequality. 317
For years, the United States was segregated on the basis of race and class.
Persons relied on the Equal Protection clause to remedy the harms caused by
318
segregation.
Currently, a significant number of minority persons are being
segregated in neighborhoods that arc plagued with environmental hazards. 319
Those persons should be able to more readily avail themselves of the
safeguards afforded by the Equal Protection Clause.
Currently, the courts rely on the Arlington Heixhts factors to determine if
the plaintiffs have made a prima facie case of dis~riminatory intcnt:120 A~ a
result, the courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff proves that
di~criminatory intent was the motivating factor behind the government
321
·
It 1s
. my contenllon
.
.
d.1ctates th at courts eva Iuate th e
action.
th at f a1mess
322
of
the
decision
to
place
the
environmental
hazard in a cenain
rea5onab\cness

Fair tenn~ of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and rnutuality: all whn
cooperate musl henefit, or >hare in comrnon hurdens, in sornc appropriate fa;hion Judged
hy a suitable benchmark of compari-;on.
Id.

317. See Deborah l:lellrnan. The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protertion, 85 M1K._. L. REV.
1, 8 (2000) (claiming that the Equal Protedion Clause 1nandate\ that the govemn1ent
demonstrate> equal concern for all c1l1lens): see a/:io Wa<;hington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976) (stating thal "[t]he central pLirpose of the r.qual Protection Clause of the 1-'ouncenlh
Amendn1ent i<; the prevention of official conduct di<;crirn1nating mi the hasis of race"): Jay S.
Bybee. 11w Equal Proce.\'.\ Clause. A Nole .:1n the (Non)Rf'lation~hip Between Romer v. Evans
and Hunter v. Erickson, 6 WM. & :'vlARY BlLL RTS. J. 201, 205 (1997); Jean1nane K. Grubert,
Note, 1he Rehnqui:it Court':i C!wnged Reading of the F:qua/ Pro1ection Clause in the Context of
Voting Right.i, 65 1-'0RDllAM L. REV. 1819, 1843-44 (1997).
318. r;.g., Brov.•u v. Hd. of Educ., 347 G.S. 481, 495 (1954) ("[Tjhe plaintiffs and others
~imilarly situated for whotu the actions have hecn brought are, by rcasun of the 1egregation
cornplmned of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amcndnient.''); .i·ee also Palmer v. Thou1pson, 403 l'.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city which
closed public swiu1ming pools rather than try lo operate thern as dc>egrcgatcd did not deny equal
protection).
319. Rohert J)_ Bullard, Envirunrnental Justice for All, in Cl\'EQUAL PROTECT!ON:
ENVIROKME:\TAL JUSTK'~, A:>;D C0'\1'l'It:Nn·1~,S OJ' COLOR 3, 11 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994)
(sl<1.t1ng !h<1.t "[n]umcrous studiesl,I dating back to the 1970.1, reveal that con1n1unitic5 of color
have bome greater health and environmental risk burden> than has 50cicty at large"); see a/:io
White, :iupra note 308, at 68---69 (di.1cuss1ng the national paucrn of low-1ncornc and 1n1norities
being disproportionately exposed to environniental ha7ards).
320. Vil!. of Arlington Height> v. Metro. Housing Dev Corp., 429 L'.S. 252, 266---68 (1977):
see also John;on v Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp 2d 944, 970 (C.D. lll. 2002).
321. See, e.i;., Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 7!, 82 (lstCir 2004).
322. According to John Rav.·ls,
[R]casonahle per<;ons arc charactenzed in two ways: Fir>l, they stand ready to offer fair
terms of social cooperation hetween equab, and the} abide by the.1e term5 if others do
also, even :.hould it be to their advantage not to: 1econd, reasonable per;on.1 recognize and
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area when deciding the issue of discriminatory intent. To equalize the process,
the court~ should apply an objective reasonableness test to determine if the
decision-maker may have been motivated by the intent to discriminate. If the
plaintiffs arc able to show that the decision to place the environmental hazard
in their neighborhood was presumptively unreasonable, the burden should shift
to the decision-makers to prove that they were not motivated by discriminatory
intent.

Under the test I propose, like in the current system, the initial burden of
proof would be on the plaintiff to prove the placement decision has a disparate
impact on a community predominately populated by persons from one racial or
123
ethic group:
'rhe next step would be for the court to ask the following
question: Was it reasonable to place the environmental hazard in the plaintiff's
neighborhood? In answering the question, the court would start with the
premise that it is unreasonable to place an environmental hazard in an area that
is already oversaturated with environmental hazards. The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that his/her neighborhood was oversaturatcd when the
government actor made the decision to place the new environmental hazard in
the area. In order to show over-saturation, the plaintiff must present evidence
indicating the percentage of the conimunity that lives in the impacted area.
Then. the plaintiff must show the percentage of the community's
environmental hazards 324 that arc located in the area. If the plaintiff proves
that, prior to the placement decision, the percentage of the ha1:ards bore by
his/her neighborhood was significantly higher than the percentage of the
community's population living in the neighborhood, he/she has proven
oversaturation. For example, if the impacted neighborhood 1nakcs up twenty
percent of the community's population and contains sixty-five percent of the
environrnental hazards located in the co1nmunity, a court should consider the
area to be over5aturated. An alternative method for detennining over!-.aturation
rnay be to focus on the level of pollution in the impacted community. This
would cover the case!> where a community with fewer environmental hazards
has niore pollution. For instance, a community with two chemical plants may
be more polluted than a community with four landfills.
()nee an area i~ cla!-.~ified as being oversaturated, there should be a
presumption it is unrea!-.onable to place another environmental hazard in the
area. Courts should presume that an unreasonable placement decision was
accept the consequence~ ol the burdens of judgrnent, which lead> to rhc idea of reasonable
toleration in a dcn1ocratic socicry.
JOH.'! RA\VLS, THI: L,\WS Or Pl'.OPLES 177 (1999) (citation<; omitted). Ba<;cd upon Rawls's
observations, it i<; my contention that rea~onable persons n1akc reasonable decisions that arc frur.
Tiu1<;, !he actions of dccision-makcr:s should be evaluated u<;ing a rea.>onablenes; ,,tandard.
323 s,,e United State<; v. !!arc, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991-92 (D. Neb. 2004).
324_ Environ111ental haL:ards should be broadly defined to include businesses like gas station>
and -.alvagc yards that reqllire go~emmcnt permission to operate in a certain area.
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motivated by discriminatory intent. In order for a court to make the
presumption, the plaintiff must prove that the decision-maker knew or should
have known about the racial make-up and the over-saturation of the selected
area. Finally, the decision-makers will have the opportunity to rebut the
presumption. The decision-makers may be able to rebut the presumption by
proving that the placement of the new hazard in the community did not make
the level of pollution in the area any worse. To prove this point, the decision
makers will have to rely upon objective scientific and statistical data.
The fair share test is not a cure-all for environmental discrimination
plaintiffs. It still requires them to obtain and submit large volumes of
information. However, the information is easily acquired through discovery,
investigative techniques, and public hearings. Further, the test only focuses
upon the placement of additional environmental hazards and does not provide a
mechanism for removing hazards from minority communities. Nonetheless,
the fair share theory is a step towards easing the burdens on minorities.
CONCLUSION

The discriminatory intent requirement has caused problems for plaintiffs in
environmental discrimination cases. Nonetheless, the requirement of intent for
proving discrimination has not lost its usefulness.
Hence, the intent
requirement should not be discarded as the foundation of an equal protection
case. Instead courts should change the manner in which they apply the intent
standard. Presently, courts look for evidence of purposeful, conscious intent to
discriminate when deciding if a government actor has violated the Equal
Protection Clause in siting an environmental hazard. Courts should view
"intent" through a broader lens in order to identify situations where the
government action was motivated by an unconscious intent to discriminate on
the part of the decision-maker.
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